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Introduction 
The resurgence of interest in social protection policy in general and Social Safety Nets (SSNs) in 
particular has been a response to the persistence of extreme poverty in many countries and the 
perceived need for a response to global economic crises. Several countries are in the process of 
expanding and/or strengthening SSNs, building on an apparent consensus that more effective SSNs 
would promote economic opportunity and enhance the productive capacity of the poor to overcome 
poverty.  
Despite the fact that the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve global poverty from the 
1990 level has been reached a few years ahead of the target date of 2015, large numbers of people 
still live under conditions of poverty. Even using the World Bank’s conservative extreme poverty line 
measure (US$1.25 per day at 2005 prices), current projections suggest that more than 1.2 billion 
people globally will fall below this in 2015. Furthermore survey evidence indicates that there is a 
clustering of many poor and vulnerable households just above this poverty line - a further 1.5 billion 
people have average consumption of between US$1.25 to $2.00 per day (2005 prices).  In reality 
US$2 per day is the average national poverty line for all developing countries and offers only a very 
frugal standard of living. It is well below what is considered an appropriate poverty line in middle 
income countries. Thus whilst there has been a trend decline in poverty over the last 30 years 
the focus of COMCEC on poverty reduction in its members countries remains highly relevant 
to the lives of millions of poor people. 
The strategic objective of COMCEC is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in member countries. 
Social protection policies in generally, and safety nets programmes in particular, are part of the 
overall strategy of poverty reduction. The case studies from this report show that, despite their 
increasing use, a large number of COMCEC member countries’ populations remain uncovered by 
social safety nets.  According a recent report by the World Bank, only 27% of the world’s population 
has access to social safety nets and, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is as low as 17.2% despite high 
prevalence of poverty.  
COMCEC aims to develop and expand SSN programmes across member states and offers support via 
a number of strategies. Its intention is to encourage networks of institutions and cooperation 
between the public sector and civil society to reach to the poor and the poorest.  COMCEC is also 
promoting people-oriented programmes that focus on productivity.  This report supports an agenda 
to improve targeting mechanisms and to reduce leakage and under-coverage such that the cost 
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effectiveness of poverty-oriented SSN programmes increases. This will be driven by initiatives to 
enhance the capacity of member countries to understand and monitor poverty on the basis of 
improved and reliable data.  
 
This report explains how social protection policy and social safety nets can play an important role in 
delivering pro-poor growth in COMCEC member states subject to effective targeting mechanisms. In 
a development context SSNs are a key component of a broader social protection strategy and are 
increasingly central to the post-MDG development agenda. This report is structured as follows: the 
first chapter provides a brief overview of broader conception of social protection, social safety nets, 
and targeting mechanism in various contexts. It also sets out the methodology and data sources of 
this review. Chapter two explores social safety nets and targeting mechanism in COMCEC member 
states, providing an analytical overview of the strengths and weaknesses of targeting mechanisms 
deployed by different programmes. Chapter three focuses on countries categorised as low income 
and lower-middle income countries, as there is considerable similarity in their experience of poverty 
and SSNs. The analysis primarily draws on case studies of three low income countries - Mozambique, 
Niger and Sierra Leone and lower middle Income Countries - Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal. 
Chapter four examines SSNs in middle income groups, most of which are considered to have a High 
Human Development Index. The analysis primarily draws on case studies of three middle income 
Countries – Iran, Turkey and Tunisia.  These countries tend to have a hybrid of universal and 
targeted SSNs that use a variety of targeting methods. Chapter five provides evidence from three 
high income COMCEC countries that enjoy abundant natural resources (mainly oil and gas) that 
support welfare systems that are an institutionalised feature of the social contract between the 
state and its citizens. These programmes tend to be funded by the state and to be universal for 
citizens. Chapter six summarises the report’s findings, followed by recommendations that would 
improve how SSN targeting mechanisms function. 
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Chapter 1: Social Safety Nets and Targeting Mechanism in COMCEC  Member 
States 
 
Social Safety Nets 
In general we define SSNs or social assistance as non-contributory transfers (monies and 
goods) that are targeted to the poor and those vulnerable to poverty and economic shocks. 
They are usually government-funded, but often supported by international official aid 
agencies and NGOs. Their aim is to enhance the poor’s capacity to self-protect against 
hazards and loss of income, which have the potential to significantly threaten their well-
being. The long-term objective is building human capital and redistribution through targeted 
efforts. According to the World Bank (2011) safety nets can contribute to human capital 
formation, for example through cash transfers to poor households, as well as the creation of 
infrastructure, for example through labour intensive public works (see table 1 for the list of 
SSNs). Such programmes help households build assets. Through positive impacts on 
economic growth, social protection and safety nets are deemed to have transformative 
potential. In practice, however, some SSN programmes are small scale and short-term with 
low coverage and limited geographical reach. However, it can be difficult to quantify SSNs 
expenditure since in some countries, the conceptual definition does not fit within the remit 
of any one government department or ministry. In some countries, for instance in the EU, 
such terminology does not exist and often SSNs is used interchangeably with social 
assistance.  
 
Social Protection 
Social safety net programmes are only one component of a social protection strategy, as 
designed and delivered by public institutions and other agencies to cover broader 
programme and policy measures aimed at poverty reduction. Social protection has been 
interpreted in different ways by governments and international development agencies. 
Conway and Norton provide a robust definition - ‘Public Action taken in response to levels of 
vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given 
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polity or society’ (Conway and Norton, 2002: 533). Whether social protection policies 
emphasise risk, rights or needs as the organizing concept, they all share common ground in 
that their broader development objective is to contribute to poverty reduction, whether 
transient or structural. For the purposes of this report, we adopt the broad definition that 
social protection aims to protect individuals and households at risk of poverty by providing 
income or consumption transfers and by enhancing the social status and wellbeing of the 
poor and vulnerable (Hulme 2004, Morvaridi, 2008). Typically, the largest social protection 
programmes are contributory, such as social insurance programmes that deliver old-age 
pensions, but it can also be combination of contributory and non-contributory. For example, 
there is a long tradition of social welfare policies in European countries founded on national 
insurance and pensions systems.  
Other broad categories of social protection expenditure are unemployment benefits, public 
health expenditure, labour market policies, disability social benefits as well as social safety 
nets or social expenditure (Diagram 1). Government expenditure on social protection 
averaged 21% of GDP across 30 OECD countries, although the range was quite wide (from 
29% in Sweden and to 12% in Turkey. Variants of the welfare state model in Europe are 
differentiated by the support they offer (Bonoli, 1997). The spectrum ranges from low levels 
of social expenditure and social assistance associated with Southern European regimes to 
the Swedish distributive model based on redistribution through taxation. The UK welfare 
system delivers benefits and services structured to provide a minimally acceptable level and 
some suggest that these benefits are being systematically reduced to the extent that the 
whole idea of social protection as a right is increasingly giving way to the idea of ‘conditional 
entitlement’ (Dwyer, 2004). 
In a development context SSNs are a key component of a broader social protection strategy 
and are increasingly central to the post MDG development agenda.  
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Diagram 1: Typical Structure of Social Protection and Social Safety Nets 
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Social Safety Nets and Development  
Whilst distribution as a solution to poverty reduction has always been a feature of 
discussions on development policy, the role of SSNs played an important part in debates on 
the impact of the macro economic reforms introduced in many countries in the 1980s and 
1990’s as part of Structural Adjustment. The poor are the group most vulnerable to the 
effects of an economic slowdown and there was also a concern that measures deemed 
necessary to promote growth might have serious negative short-term consequences for the 
most vulnerable. Strategies variously labelled as ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’, ‘pro-poor 
growth’ and more recently ‘inclusive growth’ was intended to address these worries by 
complementing economic adjustment policies with SSNs (references Stewart et al, Ravallion, 
Ali and Zhuang).   
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Poverty targeting has been used to channel resources to individuals or groups in society 
whose income in the main falls below a defined threshold, although several studies have 
shown that identifying the poor with precision is problematic (Mkandawire, 2005).   
Poverty and Social Safety Nets 
This report assesses the effectiveness and impact of SSNs targeting in relation to poverty. 
Poverty is seen in terms of a shortfall of ‘basic capabilities’ involving the inability to achieve 
certain minimally adequate levels of crucially important functions, such as being nourished 
or being sheltered. While ‘the poor’ are viewed as those whose living standards (whether in 
terms of calorific intake,  housing quality, monetary income or some other measure) falls 
below a defined absolute minimum which sets a poverty line, poverty is not merely a 
reflection of income. It also equates to deprivation of elementary capabilities, that is, a lack 
of the capability to function (Sen, 1999). When poverty prevents a person from functioning 
or exercising the capability to achieve well-being, we find failures such as premature 
mortality, significant under nourishment (especially of children), persistent morbidity, and 
widespread illiteracy and illness with lack of access to health. This is also defined by the 
UNDP Multidimensional poverty Index (MPI), which looks at overlapping deprivations in 
health, education and standard of living (income). Income is an important factor, and low 
incomes or consumption are typically correlated with other non-monetary indicators of 
well-being. However, it is not the only way to measure well–being, which has multiple 
dimensions.  How poverty is conceptualised is fundamental to how the poor are targeted by 
Social Safety Net programmes. 
 
To understand the various instruments available as part of SSNs policies and their likely 
effectiveness, it is necessary to distinguish between different approaches to targeting the 
poor (ie, categorisations) and expected beneficiaries. A simple approach would be to 
distinguish between: the chronic or long term poor; the transitory poor; and the vulnerable 
and potentially poor. 
 
The chronic poor are those who are below the poverty-line on a regular and long term basis 
(see chapter three for more detail on the chronic and vulnerable poor). This can be due to a 
number of circumstances, for example lack of access to assets such as land or credit; lack of 
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capabilities due to poor education or individual circumstances; location in a remote or 
resource-constrained region; ill health and family circumstances; discrimination due to 
ethnic background or other factors. This mixture of causes makes it clear there can be no 
single appropriate policy instrument that could function as a safety net policy for all 
categories of the poor, although there are several which try to mitigate the impact of some 
of the underlying issues1. 
How the transfer of funds could be channelled to the chronic poor is the focus of many SSNs 
either in the form of micro credit programmes, sometimes combined with training initiatives 
to allow effective investment of the funds, or to fund essential consumption. In recent years 
considerable attention has been given to targeted cash transfer programmes, in particular 
when mechanisms such as proxy means tests and formulaic means tests are used to identify 
the poor.  These transfers can be conditional cash transfers (CCT), framed around ‘desirable’ 
behaviour of recipients such as regular school attendance or use of maternity health clinics. 
Unconditional cash transfers (UCCT’s) tend to identify beneficiaries if they meet certain 
criteria with a view to raising capability in the long term, whilst increasing essential 
consumption in the short term (chapter 2 analyses cash transfers in COMCEC member 
states, such as Turkey). 
The transitory poor are those pulled below the poverty line either by family or individual 
circumstances or general economic or climatic shocks (see for instance the cases of Senegal, 
drought in Niger for drought and economic shocks in Tunis, and economic crisis in Turkey in 
2001). SSNs are needed in these cases to protect living standards and if possible prevent the 
affected households from joining the chronic poor2.  
                                                          
1 Investment in primary health and primary education tends to be focused on the long-term poor as predominant 
beneficiaries (sometimes termed ‘broad targeting’) and are typical of programmes aimed at sustained improvements in the 
capacity and capability of the poor and raising incomes in the longer term. This type of expenditure is sometimes termed 
‘broad targeting’ as it funds activities from which the poor are expected to benefit disproportionately. Such expenditure, 
combined with investment in physical infrastructure in areas where the poor are located, has proved to be central to 
thinking about how poverty concerns could be integrated into economic adjustment reform packages.  
 
2 Measures that have been used to reach this group include the distribution of free or subsidised essential goods such as 
staple foodstuffs and the guarantee of a minimum number of days of paid work (sometimes termed ‘workfare’). These 
instruments can be expensive to fund if used widely and are short-term protective measures. The vulnerable poor are 
those just above the poverty line who may enter the transitory or chronic category when their personal circumstances or 
macro or national conditions change. This is the group which national contributory pension and unemployment benefit 
schemes are designed to protect. They may also require retraining support to allow them to respond to fluctuations in the 
labour market. 
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Targeting Mechanism 
Not unsurprisingly social protection and SSNs have mostly been adopted by ‘rich’ states in 
Europe, where the protection of basic rights is promoted through welfarism’ and 
universalism and typical policy measures that protect people against the risks of inadequate 
incomes associated with employment, ill health and invalidity, parental responsibilities, old 
age or inadequate income allowing the loss of a spouse or parent, and guaranteeing access 
to services that are essential for a life in dignity (EU, 2004). In developing countries in 
general and in COMCEC member countries in particular, we find varying degrees of 
commitment to social protection and SSNs. In those with more limited social protection, the 
challenges are nevertheless the greatest. It is important to bear in mind that SSNs are not 
charity, but are ultimately set up to address an unmet responsibility of the government. In 
other words social protection and SSNs consider citizens as ‘rights-holders’ and states as 
‘duty-bearers’. 
 
Universal benefit schemes are only used in higher income countries due to their cost and 
the need to fund them through an efficient and effective tax system. Hence in most middle 
and lower income countries a form of targeting SSNs interventions at the poor is used. Since 
targeting is complex and involves an administrative cost there is always a trade-off between 
the cost of implementing a detailed targeting scheme and the benefit of ensuring that funds 
go to the most needy. There can also be a trade-off between the two types of error most 
associated with targeting – under-coverage (where some of the poor are missed) and 
leakage (where some of the benefits go to those who are not below the poverty line). 
Generally the wider a scheme is spread to reduce under-coverage there is a greater risk of 
leakage. Reducing these outcomes usually requires an administrative or transaction cost and 
there will be a trade-off between balancing the benefits of reducing these costs against the 
cost of administering the targeting scheme. 
Increasing attention on targeting in recent years has been triggered by the recognition that 
universal schemes with benefits to the better-off recouped through the tax system is both 
expensive and difficult to implement in many poorer countries. In higher income countries 
means testing based on household income is typically the preferred form of targeting. This 
approach is highly data-intensive and can be expensive to administer because it requires 
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collection and verification of information on household income and under some 
circumstances can fail to pick up the non-monetary aspects of deprivation. In practice in a 
development context all targeting schemes are designed to provide a simpler alternative to 
income-based means testing. 
The main approaches of targeting can be categorised in various ways depending upon how 
the poor are identified. Here we distinguish between: 
x Targeting by location (Geographical targeting) whereby funds and support are 
channelled to areas or regions where poverty is greatest. This approach is likely to be 
most relevant for infrastructure schemes, health and education expenditure since there 
is always a problem of identifying who are the poor within a particular area. This 
method is most appropriate where there are clearly defined geographic ‘pockets of 
poverty’, but will be less effective in communities with a more varied distribution of 
poor and non-poor, as this will greatly increase the risk of  leakage.  
x Targeting by indicator (proxy means testing) relies on the selection of indicators that 
are highly correlated with household income (or total consumption expenditure), and 
easy to collect, observe, and verify. These might include pregnancy, family size, size and 
quality of dwelling, ownership or access to land, nutrition and health status, education, 
employment, and access to credit, savings and remittances.  This method is useful 
where there is a lack of adequate detailed information and therefore crude proxies are 
needed to assess standard of living. Its effectiveness will depend on the reasonableness 
of the proxy indicators for which data are available.  
x Targeting by community identification relies on community agents to identify which 
households they feel should receive benefits. Community agents are typically religious 
groups, community leaders, NGOs, or local elected officials. Here there is a risk that the 
selection criteria applied at a local level do not match objective need with recipients 
favoured over non-recipients for subjective reasons.   
x Self-targeting where participants decide voluntarily to receive the support offered; 
examples include workfare programmes which offer very low paid jobs (that are only 
attractive to those without alternatives) and subsidies offered for inferior foodstuffs. 
Two of the best known SSNs instruments- microfinance and conditional cash transfers -
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are voluntary and thus self-targeting. These programmes are generally simpler to 
administer since recipients seek out support and do not need to be identified.  
x The term Categorical targeting is sometimes used for programmes that provide benefits 
on demand to all individuals within a specific category, for example a certain 
geographical area (in which case it becomes geographic targeting) or group (such as 
pregnant mothers or children below a certain age (in which case it becomes indicator 
targeting).  
 
Social Safety instruments used to provide support to the poor and vulnerable and raise their 
long-term social and economic prospects have taken different formats. Table 1 shows types 
of SSNs interventions, including cash and non-cash transfers and other interventions 
deployed widely over the last decade. It also shows the target beneficiaries and the variety 
of targeting mechanisms that have been used.  
Targeting mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and in many cases a combined approach is 
used in different areas or stages of a programme to improve outcomes. For example, 
geographical targeting in the case of homogeneously poor communities will be effective and 
efficient where the proportion of non-poor in those communities is acceptably low (relative 
to some policy target or to the administrative cost of the next alternative). In less 
homogenous communities, where it is harder to identify the targeted poor, proxy means-
testing may help to avoid leakage particularly if combined with some form of self-selection.  
 
Effectiveness in reaching the poor 
There is now a considerable body of evidence on the effectiveness of SSNs in reaching the 
poor and several studies have shown that identifying the poor with precision is problematic 
(Mkandawire, 2005). In terms of the effectiveness of different policy instruments a major 
conclusion of a 2004 World Bank study (Coady et al 2004) was that the choice of targeting 
instrument was less important than the overall governance environment in determining the 
degree of leakage to the non-poor. Targeted poverty programmes are delivered by a mix of 
actors with diverse collaborations and partnerships between government, NGO’s, state 
departments and/or local municipalities and businesses. Programmes are sometimes: 
government-owned (e.g. social pensions, disability grants, war veteran pensions); donor-
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financed and NGO-implemented (e.g. school meals, public works projects); or co-owned 
(e.g. social funds and cash transfers).  
In some targeting schemes the accuracy of targeting has been shown to be low such that 
the proportion of poor beneficiaries was little different from their share in the total 
population, implying that a random allocation would have had almost as much impact. High 
degrees of leakage have been reported for different types of targeting scheme. For 
example, food subsidies in Indonesia in the wake of the Financial Crisis of the late 1990’s 
have been shown to have a high leakage rate as the subsidised foodstuffs were resold on 
the market at commercial prices (Maxwell et al in Weiss 2004). Employment creation 
schemes such as those employed by various states in India at times offered wage rates high 
enough to attract those just above the poverty line and in other instances funds earmarked 
for the schemes were found to be misappropriated. Location targeting in both China and the 
Philippines was also subject to targeting errors. In China whilst funds went to poor areas 
there was less evidence that it was the poorest within those areas who received the bulk of 
the benefits (Wang in Weiss 2004). In the Philippines the distribution of regional funds 
between provinces was not progressive in income terms. 
Targeted cash transfer programmes are considered to be a solution to problems associated 
with poverty, in particular when they are conditional on changes in household behaviour. 
The pattern of programmes is diverse, with some geared towards long-term objectives such 
as the Progresa Oportunidades in Mexico and others focused on more short-term outcomes, 
such as the Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Ghosh 2011). There is evidence that some programmes 
have been effective in alleviating poverty and changing behaviour. For example, Attanasio 
and Mesnard (2006) provide evidence of the positive impact on consumption of a 
conditional cash transfer programme the Programme Familias en Acción run by the 
Colombian government and funded by the World Bank with the main objective the 
accumulation of human capital amongst the poor. The conditional components of the 
programme related to health, education and nutrition with the programme found to have 
had positive impacts on consumption, including expenditure high proteins (milk, meat) and 
children's clothing and education. Similarly studying CCTs programmes in South Africa and 
Latin America Barrientos and Delong (2006) concluded that cash transfers are an effective 
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model in reducing child poverty if other services such as safe water, education and health 
are available. 
 
Table 1: Types of Social Safety Net Interventions 
 
Cash Beneficiaries Targeting methods 
- Cash Transfer      
- Conditional cash transfer programs 
(CCTs)  
- Old age allowance 
- Maternity allowance for the poor 
mothers 
- Allowance for widowed 
- Grants for orphanages 
- Allowance for disabled 
- Social Assistance / income support 
programs 
- Family / Child Allowance 
- Non-contributory pensions 
- Disability benefits      
                              
- Poor working families 
- Those not expected to work, 
e.g. children, the elderly, 
disabled 
- Those needing temporary relief 
 
- Means and proxy means  
- Categorical selection: 
children, old, disabled, 
etc. 
Non-Cash Beneficiaries Targeting methods 
- Food transfers and subsidies 
- Price support for food 
- Location of physical infrastructure 
(roads, power lines etc.) and social 
infrastructure (schools and clinics etc.)  
- Employment guarantee schemes  
- Basic Transfers: including in-kind 
transitional safety net assistance 
(TSN), to cover the basic needs of ex-
combatants; provision of ‘starter 
packs’ (including fertilizers, tools, etc.) 
- Education related: school vouchers, 
scholarships, fee waivers 
- Health related: fee waivers and 
exemptions for health care services 
- Energy subsidies 
- Housing: support for housing 
improvement, rent subsidies, housing 
assistance 
 
- Poor people that need to improve 
nutritional status 
- Malnourished children; pregnant 
and lactating mothers  
- Those attending schools in poor 
communities 
- Refugees and other misplaced 
population 
- Poor and extreme poor families 
both working and not working 
- Poor unemployed at the margin of 
labour market 
- Poor short term unemployed and 
seasonal workers 
- Poor and vulnerable families with 
low level of human capital 
- poor families who cannot afford 
the cost of the health and 
education 
- Poor students that would drop 
out 
- Geographic 
- Self-targeting (using 
inferior commodities) 
- Means or proxy means 
- Self-targeting (by 
subsidizing only basic 
staples and inferior 
commodities) 
- Self-selection by setting 
program remuneration 
below the minimum 
wage 
- Other means of 
rationing if needed – 
community 
- Categorical Geographic  
- Community (together 
with one of above) 
- Health related 
conditions 
Other Beneficiaries  Targeting methods 
- Non-governmental social safety nets 
and  private income redistribution 
(zakat, sadegeh, korbani)  
- Faith based organisation and NGOs 
service delivery 
- Micro-credit / income generation 
opportunities 
- Disaster Management 
- Training for beneficiaries: mainly 
vocational and skills training 
- Public Work 
- Poor people that have low 
incomes 
- Muslims in local communities 
- Poor in geographical areas 
subject to disasters eg tsunami, 
earthquakes 
- Unemployed 
- Categorical 
 
- Categorical 
 
- Categorical 
 
Source: Milazzo and Grosh (2008), Subbarao (2009), World Bank 2012a 
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It is estimated that globally cash transfers benefit between 0.75 to 1 billion people (Arnold 
et al 2011). The World Bank cites cash transfer programmes in Turkey, Bangladesh and 
Morocco as examples where ‘conditional school attendance and targeting areas with high 
incidences of school dropouts and poverty has had a significant positive impact in reducing 
dropouts especially among girls’ (World Bank 2012a). 
The use of cash transfers to alter household behaviour through conditionality has been 
credited with considerable success particularly in Brazil and Mexico. There a relatively high 
proportion of those with below average incomes have received cash support. Studies on the 
impact of such transfers suggest that they have raised family food consumption and had a 
noticeable impact on the targets of increasing school enrolment and progression and 
attendance at health facilities (World Bank 2009). What is less clear, however, is whether 
education standards or health outcomes have been improved. The overall objective is to 
raise the capability of family members and this requires an education and health system 
capable of delivering improved results. Conditional transfers, in the absence of further 
improvements in these systems, may have little long-run impact beyond sustaining family 
consumption in the short-term.     
Cash transfers are in principle relatively easy to administer once the target beneficiaries 
have been identified. However identifying the right set of beneficiaries is not 
straightforward. In some cases community participation selected on the basis of the views 
of community leaders has been used. However there is no guarantee that this will identify 
those in most need.  A survey of practices in Indian villages shows the use of selection by 
rank in terms of assessed need. Beneficiaries tended to be identified on the basis of land 
ownership or use rather than on measures like consumption expenditure or monetary 
income (Srivastava in Weiss and Khan 2005).  
Another common type of SSNs is microfinance. Microfinance programmes offer both 
microcredit and saving facilities for the poor. Originally seen as part of subsidised donor-
supported programmes with limited outreach and based on group lending schemes, it has 
now developed into a commercially oriented segment of the financial sector lending 
increasingly to individual borrowers (Weiss 2011). It clearly reaches small borrowers who 
would otherwise have little access to loans and some commercially oriented schemes have 
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been shown to have an impact on poverty reduction (Montgomery and Weiss 2010). 
However there is a concern supported by evidence from some of the early studies on 
microcredits that the key beneficiaries are the entrepreneurial poor and those just above 
the poverty line. This suggests that access to micro loans needs to be complemented by 
training programmes to raise the capability of the poor to use the funds effectively. 
 
Methodology and Data Sources 
In line with COMCEC Strategy of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger this study aims to 
meet the following objectives:   
x Examine the current state of SSNs systems on poverty alleviation and assess poverty 
targeting mechanisms  and their effectiveness in COMCEC members 
x Bring together new evidence, most notably data from a selective sample of countries, 
to analyse methods of targeting and any problems associated with leakage or under-
coverage 
x Develop policy recommendations related to how SSNs could be more efficient, 
inclusive and effective in COMCEC member states 
 
COMCEC comprises 57 member states that are geographically dispersed over four 
continents and can be differentiated by income and human development.  
For analytical purposes and to allow comparison of similar and different COMCEC member 
countries in relation to socio-economic and political formation, we have classified them into 
four groupings based on income group (see table 2). However, as we have pointed out 
above, income poverty is considered to be insufficient for measuring poverty and for the 
purposes of exploring the current targeting mechanisms of SSNs in the COMCEC member 
countries we also use the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) for analysis of different 
countries. The HDI is made up of composite indicators that use three dimensions of human 
development: a) living longer and healthier (life expectancy), b) education and c) living 
standard (income) to arrive at an indexed value of the average level of human development 
in a given country (UNDP, 2013a). The HDI also incorporates a Multidimensional Poverty 
Index (MPI), which identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, 
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health and standard of living. Table I in Appendix shows COMCEC countries classified as 
having Very High Human Development (VHHD), High Human Development (HHD), Medium 
Human Development (MHD) and Low Human Development (LHD).  
We randomly selected 3 countries from each grouping (12 in total) as the focus of this study 
(highlighted in Table 2). Within the limited timeframe for this study and given financial 
constraints, travelling to 12 countries to collect empirical data was not feasible.  Analysis for all 
12 countries has therefore been based on available documents and secondary sources, 
including published data and literature from the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, Asian 
Development Bank, UNICEF, WFO and the relevant ministries in the countries that we 
studies. Further data has been gathered by way of questionnaires sent to relevant government 
departments in these countries, but the response rate of these has been very low, which is not 
unexpected with postal and internet questionnaires.   
We selected 4 countries, one from each income group as the focus of more detailed analysis 
of SSN systems and targeting mechanisms: Oman (high Income country), Tunisia (Middle 
income country), Senegal (lower middle income country) and Sierra Leone (Low income 
country). We also choose Turkey to understand recent shift in social safety nets and social 
protection programmes. This aspect of the work involved short fieldwork visits to collect 
data from different ministries responsible for the implementation of SSNs. In Turkey data 
was collected from the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Ankara Municipality, 
Yenimahalle Vakif and the Ministry of Development. In Tunisia data was collected from the 
Ministry of Family and Social Affairs for Solidarity, Economic Advisors to the Prime Minister, 
Social and Development Advisor to the President and the African Development Bank. In 
Senegal data was collected from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Poverty 
Alleviation department, the Delegation of Social Protection, UNICEF and the World Bank and 
in Sierra Leon data was collected from Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children 
Affairs. In Oman data was collected from Ministry of Housing, Supreme Council of Planning 
and focus group interview with local people in Muscat. 
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Table 2: COMCEC Member State by Income 
High Income 
($12, 616+) 
Upper Middle Income 
($4,086 - $12,615) 
Lower Middle Income 
($1,036 – $4,085) 
Low Income 
($1,035 or less) 
1. Bahrain 8. Albania 24. Cameroon 40. Afghanistan  
2. Brunei- Darussalam 9. Algeria 25. Cote D'IVOIRE 41. Bangladesh 
3. Kuwait 10. Azerbaijan 26. Djibouti 42. Benin   
4.  Oman 11. Gabon 27. Egypt 43. Burkina – Faso 
5. Qatar 12. Iran 28. Guyana  44. Chad 
6. Saudi Arabia 13.  Iraq 29. Indonesia  45. Comoros  
7. United Arab Emirates 14. Jordan 30. Mauritania  46. Gambia 
 15. Kazakhstan 31. Morocco  47. Guinea 
 16. Lebanon 32. Nigeria 48. Guinea – Bissau 
 17. Libya 33. Pakistan 49. Kyrgyzstan 
 18. Malaysia 34. Senegal 50. Tajikistan 
 19. Maldives 35. Sudan 51. Uganda 
 20. Suriname  36. Syria 52. Mozambique 
 21. Tunisia 37. Uzbekistan 53. Mali 
 22. Turkey 38. Palestine  54. Niger 
 23. Turkmenistan 39. Yemen 55. Sierra Leone 
   56. Togo 
   57. Somali 
 Source: Compiled from the World Bank (2013) 
 
 
 
Chapter 2:  Social Safety Nets and Targeting Mechanisms in COMCEC Member 
States 
COMCEC member countries are diverse with respect to their income per capita, GDP and 
their human development indicators (as shown in graphs 1 & 2). At one end of the scale, 
some countries have the highest income and human development indicators in the world 
while, at the other, there are some of the very poorest. UAE, for example, has a GI per 
capita of $42,716 per annum, very high human development (0.818 on UNDP HDI) and a life 
expectancy of 76.7, whereas Niger has a GI per capita of $0.853 per annum, low human 
development (0.334 on UNDP HDI) and a life expectancy of 51.9.  The 57 member states are 
distributed across four income categories - high, middle, middle-low and low income. They 
are also distributed across four groupings based on human development indicators, as 
shown in the graphs below. These represent a selection of countries from each category.   
These categorisations are not coterminous, but the distribution is broadly similar in that a 
country with high income is likely to score high on aggregated human development 
indicators and a low income country is likely to score much lower. Across all countries 
however there can be inequalities reflected in individual development indicators. 
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The data available on existing SSNs expenditure and the number of beneficiaries is erratic. 
This makes it very difficult to comparatively analyse outcomes relative to expenditure across 
countries and regions. Table 3 shows the percentage of GDP allocated to social expenditure 
in selected COMCEC member countries. Countries such as Cameroon, Sierra Leone and 
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Senegal that have low income and human development indicators spend between 0.2% and 
0.8% of their GDP on SSNs. The World Bank’s analysis indicates that mean spending on SSNs 
is 1.9% of GDP and median spending is 1.4% of GDP across developing and transition 
countries. Around 30% of the COMCEC member countries spend between 1% and 2% of 
GDP on SSNs. Most poor countries in West Africa, Mozambique, Pakistan and Tajikistan 
spend considerably less than 1% of their GDP on SSNs, whereas in some countries the 
amount is higher as it includes international aid (2.5% in Bangladesh and 4% in Djibouti, of 
which only 0.5% is domestically financed) (World Bank, 2009).   
 
Table 3: Social Expenditure* as % of GDP in Selected COMCEC Member States 
Country Social Assistance 
Expenditure as % GDP 
Social Protection  
Expenditure as % GDP 
Year 
Albania 1.2 6.7 2006 
Azerbaijan 1.00 5.5 2012 
Bangladesh 2.5 n.a. 2012 
Djibouti 4.9 10.0 2003 
Egypt 1.6 4.3 2000 
Iran 2.7 3.8 2000 
Indonesia 0.7 n.a. 2012 
Jordan 1.3 5.3 2002 
Kazakhstan 2.2 5.4 2002 
Kyrgyzstan 0,7 5.8 2001 
Lebanon 0.4 2.9 2004 
Morocco 1.9 4.7 1999 
Nigeria 0.5 n.a 2012 
Pakistan 0.4 1.8 2004 
Tajikistan 0.4 1.9 2012 
Turkey 1.4 12.5 2012 
Senegal 0.6 n.a 2012 
Sierra Leone 0.2  2012 
Uzbekistan 2.0 9.0 2000 
Yemen 1.0 1.9 1999 
Source: OECD, 2008, World Bank, 2009, 2012 data: country reports. (*Social expenditure is taken to be SSNs) 
 
 
 
All COMCEC member counties have some form of social protection and social safety net 
policies that are aimed at reducing poverty or preventing deprivation. There is vast variation 
however in the scope of these policies and their targeting mechanisms, which is not 
surprising given the economic, political and social diversity of member states and variance in 
poverty (as shown in Graph 3).  31% (150 million) of the total population in COMCEC 
member states live below the income poverty threshold of 1.25$ a day (COMCEC, 2013). 
19 | P a g e  
 
Table I in appendix shows that 25 member states are in the category of Low Human 
Development category and only 4 of member states are in the very high human development 
category. 
 
Social Safety Nets – Universal versus Targeted Approaches 
The social safety net model and methods of targeting that countries prefer to adopt are 
contextual and needs based. The diverse range and depth of programmes across COMCEC 
countries does however provide a broad spectrum from which the efficacy and targeting 
efficiency of different forms of SSNs can be evaluated. In countries with high incomes 
(Brunei-Darussalam, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), governments 
provide generous universal and untargeted social protection policies for their own citizens 
(but not migrants or foreign workers). Countries in low and lower middle income groups, 
such as Afghanistan, Benin, Chad, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Mali, and others tend to have 
limited resources and institutional capacity, resulting in the use of targeted social safety 
nets but with low coverage.  
A number of variables and drivers also influence choice, including politics, governance 
structure, institutional capability, available funding and technical ability to implement and 
maintain social safety net programmes. In Turkey, for example, a key objective of recent 
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changes (since 2011) in the governance structure of social expenditure programmes has 
been to strengthen institutional capacity and citizen access. The introduction of a national 
targeting system and a single beneficiary registry uses a single Proxy Means Test (PMT) to 
target benefits more efficiently and increase social inclusion (see below for more detail). As 
Turkey has pretty much eliminated extreme poverty the Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies are now in the process of reconstructing PMT to suit different political needs. 
There is an undoubted need to increase coverage of SSNs programmes in low and lower 
middle income countries, but major inhibitors include fiscal constraint, institutional capacity 
to deliver assistance to more people and ineffective targeting mechanisms which do not 
adequately identify ‘the right poor’. The methods used are mainly categorical, geographical, 
and community based targeting. At the other end of the spectrum, COMCEC member 
countries with high incomes have adopted universalism, with strong social protection and 
SSN programmes including high subsidies on fuel and food. The most significant leakage is in 
relation to generalised price subsidies on food and fuel, which sees people benefitting that 
do not need this support. Untargeted subsidies for food and fuel can however be inefficient 
as they are available to the non-poor. According to IMF and World Bank reports, these kinds 
of SSN programmes are most at risk of leakage. Evidence from a World Bank study shows 
that in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan, the richest quintile captures 40–60% of all fuel 
subsidy benefits, because the rich consume more energy products than the poor (World 
Bank 2012a). While they may help reduce poverty, untargeted programmes on their own do 
not achieve the wider objective of addressing the social exclusion of the vulnerable by 
providing access to human capital and economic opportunities. In Tunisia indirect food 
subsidies, which amount to 4% of GDP, have contributed to poverty reduction, but at the 
same time there is enormous leakage and only 20% of the subsidies reach the poorest 
quintile.  In this context political factors play a crucial role in how subsidies operate and why 
they are retained.   
Some countries are increasing use of safety net programmes in order to focus on the poor 
and reduce leakage. The government in Indonesia chose to divert some of fuel subsidies to 
conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) for the 19 million poor households who did 
not have access to education and health insurance. Following the successful implementation 
of Bolsa Familia in Brazil and the positive experience of other Latin American countries, 
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many COMCEC member states, such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh and Lebanon have 
actively pursued conditional and un-conditional cash transfers to reduce poverty. These are 
considered to be more effective than universal benefits and are becoming a preferred 
approach in many COMCEC member states. Table II in appendix provides examples of 
COMCEC member states that have implemented CCTs and details the type of projects, 
targeting methods, beneficiaries, methods of payment and conditions for this type of social 
transfer. This does not include countries that are piloting CCTs (such as, Morocco, Senegal, 
Lebanon, Sierra Leone and others).  
There is evidence from Turkey (see table 2 in Appendix), the pilot Tassir programme in 
Morocco, Yemen and Bangladesh that CCTs have been effective in alleviating poverty and 
changing behaviours. Many CCTs focus on increasing human capital and resilience among 
excluded groups, such as women and children. Programmes in Turkey, Yemen, Bangladesh 
and Indonesia target groups at risk of not being educated to tackle inter-generational 
poverty and break the poverty cycle. These programmes in themselves are not a panacea 
for poverty, however, and they have to be accompanied by other development and 
infrastructure advances. Increasing attendance at school for example will not improve 
educational attainment unless the quality of education is good.  
The shift away from universal subsidies to cash transfers is not always successful at 
targeting those in most need. Iran successfully reduced general fuel and food subsidies and 
simultaneously introduced a phased implementation of universal cash transfers to increase 
assistance to the poor, but these are not targeted and therefore high leakage still results.  
There is no one-size-fits all targeting mechanism. Table II in appendix shows that CCTs have 
adopted geographic targeting and sub-categories based on localities and/or demographic or 
socio-economic profiles, such as children of school age in specific rural areas or people with 
low incomes suffering from transient poverty. In some chronically poor or low income 
countries where institutions and registration systems are weak, targeting is basically 
redundant. In a low income country such as Niger, population estimates are often 
inaccurate and household survey data is very outdated and would be ineffective therefore 
as a basis for planning the targeting of SSN programmes. Household or individual targeting 
is not a suitable approach in Niger because so many households, especially in rural areas, 
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suffer from poverty. Secondly, given the difficult climate conditions of the Sahel, individual 
targeting would be ineffective in drought affected larger areas. Administrative targeting 
(non-community members deciding eligibility according to observable indicators) could be 
useful for specific targeting, for example to select recipients of nutrition programmes, but 
on the other hand, there are large areas where the majority of people would benefit from 
additional nutrition undermining the need for complex targeting processes.  
 
Informal or Non-Governmental Social Safety Nets 
 Many social safety nets in COMCEC countries are provided by governments, in both the 
financial and administrative sense. However, SSNs are not exclusively provided or delivered 
by governments.  Some are funded and delivered by international donor agencies and NGOs 
including faith-based organisations (FBOs). Formal and informal remittances also provide a 
lot of support for poor communities. Effectively in low and lower middle low income 
countries, a large proportion of SSN programmes tend to fall within the aid and 
philanthropy complex to the extent that half of health and education services are supported 
by international donor agencies, and philanthropic organisations (Deneulin and Bano, 2009). 
In Senegal, an evaluation of 24 projects shows that 62% of social safety nets are dependent 
on aid agencies. As a consequence in many of these countries social protection and SSN 
programmes are fragmented and responsibilities for implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation are often devolved to different departments, agencies and donors that sit 
outside of direct government control. The fact that some projects and programmes are not 
within the government’s domain can result in project overlap and duplication. This is 
symptomatic of weak country ownership of social safety net programmes. 
 
Evidence shows that non-state SSNs provided by non-governmental organisations and 
foundations, the extended family, friends and clans does not fill the gap left by inadequate 
state support, engendering risk for vulnerable groups, including the unemployed, the elderly 
and children (MacLean, 2010). They are nevertheless essential at times of crisis, economic 
shock and natural disaster for many poor families. In Cote d’Ivoire, for example, informal 
safety nets have been a critical source of support for the population as the country has 
struggled with political crises and rising poverty rates. A recent World Bank study describes 
how, when a shock strikes, families in Cote d’Ivoire often turn first to their family and 
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kinship networks for support, which work on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. A 
complex layering of support networks (from family to village associations, ethnic-based 
associations in urban centres; faith-based groups and associations of specific groups, such as 
retirees or disabled associations) can be called upon for support. These layered networks of 
informal support mechanisms tend to be unable to protect households from covariant 
shocks and can be regressive. For example, household surveys indicate that the average 
private transfer value for the top deciles of the population is about five times larger than the 
average for the bottom four deciles. As poverty and inequality rises in Cote d’Ivoire, it 
appears that the principle of reciprocity is being applied more strictly. Even relatively well-
off households report limiting their assistance to their nuclear family and to relatives who 
would be able to reciprocate, “we help those who help, those who have helped and those 
who could help.” (Soko, N’Guessan, Falcy (2010).) 
 
Diaspora and migrant remittances are the most significant provider of social safety nets in 
some countries. In Tajikistan, for example, remittances from workers in Russia amount to 
40% of GDP.  Money sent by migrants to their family and kin supports their well-being and 
improves their standard of living. In fact a number of studies have shown that families with 
relatives that have migrated are more likely to send their children to school, using cash from 
remittances to pay fees and other costs. Families receiving remittances are found to have 
higher rates of child schooling compared with those who do not (Cox-Edwards and Ureta 
2003, Yang 2008). The function of remittances is to diversify sources of income and to 
cushion families against setbacks, such as illness or larger shocks caused by economic 
downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries. (UNDP, 2009). Recent examples include 
the 2004 Hurricane Jeanne in Haiti, the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2005 earthquake 
in Pakistan.  
Many governments rely on remittances to substitute investment in social programmes. The 
amount of remittances sent home by migrants from Tajikistan was estimated to be about 
US$ 2.67 billion or 49% of GDP in 2008 (ILO, 2010). According to the data of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Tajikistan, the total number of 
labour migrants in 2008 was 720,000, the majority of whom were in Russia. Remittances 
play a vital role in the economic wellbeing of the population, with about 89% of emigrants 
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regularly sending remittances to their relatives in Tajikistan which are used to solve financial 
problems and cover immediate basic needs, including housing, food, education and 
healthcare.  For more than 60% of households in Tajikistan, remittances account for more 
than half of their income and for 31% they make up 100% of their income. 
Other informal SSNs also result in the non-contributory transfer to the poor to achieve 
poverty reduction. Many local NGOs and faith-based organisations (FBOs) are involved in 
delivering safety nets to the poor. A large number of Islamic NGOs, for example, successfully 
mobilize charitable donations and channel them to the destitute. Islamic NGOs draw upon 
institutions of giving within Islam, which oblige Muslims with a certain level of wealth to 
give to charities, and encourage optional contributions such as Zekat, Sadaka, Zekat al-fitr 
(alms giving) and Kurbai (a sacrificing celebration). These forms of giving have a moral value, 
as they are acts of duty. There is little data available on how much Muslims give through 
these institutions, but it is estimated that globally more than $20 billion is donated annually 
by 1.5 billion Muslims (Fourth Congress of Muslim Philanthropists, 2011). Islamic NGOs are 
likely to be expected providers of safety net activity in COMCEC member states.  
In some countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, these forms of giving 
constitute the largest transfer system from the wealthy to the poor and vulnerable. In the 
absence of income taxation, the Islamic alms system of Zakat contributes a share to the 
social spending of governments in Pakistan, Burundi, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The 
payment of Zakat is calculated annually on the bases of income and property (circa 2.5% of 
an individual’s total savings and assets). In Saudi Arabia the current rates of Zakat are 2.5% 
of the value of traded goods, 5% of the value of crops from irrigated land and 10% of the 
value of non-irrigated land crops, whereas found treasures are taxed at 20% (Althnian, 2012, 
4). Not all member countries collect Zakat via the government in the form of taxes and rely 
instead on individual actions. 
Even charitable donations to the needy such as Zakat have been shown to be subject to 
leakage.   An analysis of the distribution of Zakat across cities in Pakistan has revealed a 
relatively high degree of leakage to those with below average incomes but who are not 
necessarily below the poverty line (Arif in Weiss and Khan 2005). This suggests that charity is 
local and giving to the poor in an area is not about judging recipients by national standards 
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but more local ones. In addition there are some concerns that Zakat funds are held back for 
personal gain by local committees rather than distributed to the needy.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the range of SSN programmes used by different country 
groupings based on income and with reference to deprivation and inequality. What is 
noticeable is the proliferation of conditional cash transfer across COMCEC member states. 
The analysis provides an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different programmes 
in relation to targeting mechanisms. The lack of effective monitoring and evaluation systems 
in most countries makes it difficult however to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different approaches.  These constraints are amplified in very poor, fragile and post-conflict 
states as we shall in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Countries in Low Income and Lower Middle Income Group 
This chapter brings together analysis of countries categorised as Low Income and Lower 
Middle Income, as there is considerable similarity in their experience of poverty and SSNs. 
The analysis below primarily draws on case studies of three Low Income Countries - 
Mozambique, Niger and Sierra Leone and three Lower Middle Income Countries - 
Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal.  All of these countries are classified as low on the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index, other than Egypt which, on the basis of 2008 data, was 
considered to have medium human development even though its income is lower than 
Cameroon’s (reflecting investment in education and health). More recent data shows that 
poverty increased sharply across the country between 2009 and 2011 (WFP, 2013b). 
Table 4: Poverty Indicators for Low Income and Lower Middle Income Case Study Countries 
 
Challenges in Targeting the Poor  
In low and middle income countries chronic poverty and food security remains high despite 
the fact that in some countries there has been a decade of steady economic growth.  
Although each country differs in terms of social, political and economic make-up, they have 
the following common characteristics that are relevant to social protection and social safety 
nets programmes:  
x High poverty rates as shown in Table 4 and Graph 3. More than 55% live in extreme 
poverty and, in some countries such as Mozambique, the poverty rate is as high as 
79% and more than 30% live in extreme food poverty (UNDP, 2013b).  A high 
proportion of the population therefore would be eligible for SSNs support.  
MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX
COUNTRY
COMCEC 
Rank on 
HDI
HDI Intensity of deprivation
 Population 
vulnerable 
to poverty
 Population 
in severe 
poverty 
PP $1.25 
National 
Poverty Line
value  Year  value  (%)   (thousands)   (%)   (%)   (%)   Education   Health  Living 
standards  
 2002–2011  2002–2012
Cameroon 34 0.495  2004 (D)   0.287   53.3   9,149   53.9   19.3   30.4   25.7   24.5   49.8   9.6   39.9  
Egypt 23 0.662 2008 (D)   0.024   6.0   4,699   40.7   7.2   1.0   48.1   37.3   14.5   1.7   22.0  
Nigeria 35 0.471 2008 (D)   0.310   54.1   83,578   57.3   17.8   33.9   27.0   32.2   40.8   68.0   54.7  
Sierra Leone 46 0.359 2008 (D)   0.439   77.0   4,321   57.0   13.1   53.2   31.5   19.3   49.2   53.4   66.4  
Mozambique 50 0.327 2009 (D)   0.512   79.3   18,127   64.6   9.5   60.7   23.9   36.2   39.9   59.6   54.7  
Niger 51 0.304  2006 (D)   0.642   92.4   12,437   69.4   4.0   81.8   35.4   21.5   43.2   43.6   59.5  
Senegal 57  0.470  2010/2011 (D)   0.439   74.4   7,642   58.9   11.7   50.6   31.8   40.6   27.6   33.5   50.8  
SOURCE: AND CHECK NOTES FROM ORIGINAL TABLE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
Poverty Index Multidimensional Poverty
 Population below income 
poverty line (%)  
Headcount
 Contribution of deprivation 
to overall poverty (%)  
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x Very young populations with very high dependence ratios that create specific 
poverty challenges, including high infant mortality and child nutrition problems. 
x Low contributory social protection schemes (only 2% to 3% of people have social 
insurance and pensions), increasing a need for state support. 
x Weak institutions and administrative capacity that can inhibit successful 
implementation and monitoring. 
x Weak governance (specifically in fragile states) that can undermine programme 
development and implementation. 
x Fiscal constraints and lack of state funding to devolve to SSNs. Some states, such as 
Cameroon, spend as little as 0.2% of GDP on SSNs, which is so low that it will not 
have any impact on poverty reduction (World Bank, 2012c). 
x Reliance on private transfers such as remittances and social networks to assist 
families living in poverty or facing severe economic shocks caused by drought, 
floods, failed harvests etc.  
x A high percentage of the population whose livelihoods are based on the informal 
sector and who are not registered with the state and not included social safety nets 
programmes. 
x High levels of internal population movement (e.g. in relation to famines and other 
crises or nomadic populations), which impacts on the identification and tracking of 
target groups. 
 
Finding sufficient resources to invest in both accelerating economic growth and providing 
social protection to the large proportion of the population who are poor and vulnerable is a 
significant challenge for countries of low or lower middle incomes. In the majority of these 
countries, SSN programmes are donor dependent, funded by NGOs such as the World Bank. 
This means that they are driven by a conditionality and aid effectiveness framework. While 
the engagement of donor agencies can bring much-needed capacity to support programme 
development and delivery, reliance on donor agencies can also impede longer-term benefits 
for poverty reduction.  
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Donor-led projects can be fragmented and their coverage tends to be low. In Cameroon, for 
example, nutrition programmes are mainly run by international organisations, such as 
UNICEF, CARE, the Catholic Relief Services and the World Bank and emergency responses to 
food crises is often supported by the World Food Programme (World Bank, 2012c, iv). Other 
SSNs are scattered around the country, including several small ad hoc SSNs in the country 
(school feeding, temporary food emergency assistance, free waivers and small cash 
transfers), without much coordination or cooperation between them (World Bank, 2013e, 
3). It is virtually impossible for so many SSNs activities to be fully co-ordinated to ensure 
coverage is appropriate and targeting is effective. Most of the SSNs use geographic targeting 
or self-targeting. These individual SSN programmes cover at best only 1% of the population 
in Cameroon. For instance school feeding programmes which target girls in geographic 
zones have very limited coverage of only 5.3% in the poorest areas in the north of the 
country. Moreover, those who are reached are not necessarily the poorest of the poor. 
Cameroon is an example of a country where SSNs are missing completely in large areas, and 
those few SSNs that are in place are fragmented and lack an overarching framework that 
links them in a co-ordinated system. It demonstrates the need for SSNs to be linked to a 
national social protection strategy to improve targeting (World Bank, 2012a, vii) 
The following case studies show that coverage of SSNs across low income and lower-middle 
income countries tends to be fragmented and subject to under-coverage as much as 
leakage. 
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Case Study: Niger 
Niger is 186th out of 187 listed countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013a). 
The country is struggling with extreme climatic conditions, raising food prices, the aftermath 
of the global economic crisis and lack of income diversification. Chronic vulnerability is 
closely linked to food crises, and severe and acute malnutrition is common, reaching 12% in 
2009 and 15% in 2010. Basic services are improving steadily in Niger but people in rural 
areas are particularly vulnerable. Two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, 
especially in rural areas where 63 per cent of people live in poverty. The economic growth 
of 2.3% is not strong enough to satisfy the basic needs for education and health of the 
swelling population (Niang et al., 2012; UNICEF, 2012; IRIN, 2012). The country is also 
affected by a conflict in northern Mali and the dried up flow of remittances from expatriates 
in Tunisia. 
Social Safety Nets in Niger 
x Typical SSN programmes in Niger: targeted food and nutrition support – e.g. cereal 
banks, food-for-work programmes, feeding programmes, subsidised cereal prices 
and vouchers for seeds throughout the 2000s (Pelham et al. 2011, 119); piloting cash 
transfers. 
x Providers: Government-led social protection is sparse in Niger and SSNs operating in 
the country are donor and NGO-led. Key agencies include the UN (cash transfers), 
the World Bank (Social Safety Net), the World Food Programme, UNICEF (various 
programmes) and numerous local NGOs.  
x Total SSN expenditure across all programmes is not known as they are fragmented 
and poorly co-ordinated. 
 
Social protection is a relatively new concept in Niger, as the country only adopted an Action 
Plan for Social Safety Nets in 2010 and a National Social Protection Policy in 2011, which 
covers: (1) food and nutrition security; (2) social security including work opportunities for 
poorest populations; (3) basic social services and infrastructure; (4) specific actions targeting 
particularly vulnerable groups; (5) strengthening legislative framework. One of the most 
important components of this Social Protection Policy is the National Social Safety Net 
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Programme undertaken in cooperation with the World Bank and UNICEF. The programme, 
which reached 1,000 villages, 40,000 households (210,000 people) in 2012  is piloting cash 
transfers targeted at groups most vulnerable to cyclical food shortages, accommodating 
40,000 households (Niang et al. 2012; UNICEF, 2012, 3). The programme used Key Family 
Practices (UNICEF's set of guidelines for childcare and health) as soft conditionality, with 
associated measurable success at improving household health, nutrition, and sanitation 
practices (apparently achieving in four months what the KFP campaign had achieved alone 
in four years). A follow-up survey revealed that 83% of cash was used to buy food. 
Moreover, 72% of households were able to save money or invest it in livestock, diversified 
economic activities or invested in agricultural inputs. A further 30,000 households will 
participate in a cash-for-work scheme. The two year project provides also 60 days of work 
for 15,000 people each year. Other programmes include cash-for-work schemes that are 
considered to be most effective during a slow-onset food crisis (Woodke, 2012, 13). Table 5 
shows the reach of the UNICEF WASH programme in Niger in 2012, which included a range 
of safety net measures, targeted at population clusters.  
Table 5: UNICEF WASH Programme in Niger 
  Cluster 2012 target 
Cluster 
total 
results 
UNICEF 
2012 
target 
UNICEF 
total 
results 
NUTRITION 
Children < 5 years old with severe acute malnutrition 
admitted into therapeutic feeding programme           393,737        312,148        393,737        312,148  
Children < 5 years old immunized for measles in 
refugee camps       3,500,000    3,325,000    3,500,000     3,325,000  
HEALTH 
Children < 5 immunized for measles in refugee camps               4,068  3,630  
Households in affected area receiving two insecticide-
treated bed nets (ITNs) in refugee camps     5,456             4,092  
Population affected by acute watery diarrhoea having 
access to lifesaving curative interventions             23,816             5,041  
WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE 
Emergency-affected population provided with access 
to safe water as per agreed standards           978,096        206,000         41,128          33,887  
Children and women receiving critical WASH-related 
information to prevent child illness           734,490        159,436        393,737          10,918  
CHILD PROTECTION 
Children provided with access to community spaces 
for socialization, play and learning             10,000            6,569          10,000             6,233  
EDUCATION 
Emergency-affected children (including adolescents)           150,000          67,600        105,000          52,600  
Results through 31 October 2012         
(Source: UNICEF, 2012 (http://www.unicef.org/appeals/niger.html) 
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Many of the SSN programmes in Niger have been designed as stand-alone programmes 
dealing with identified issues such as predicted food shortages with food distribution and 
subsidised prices, rather than component parts of long-term development programmes. 
Woodke (2012, 13) argues that the government should take a more decentralised approach, 
allowing local communities and NGOs to combine cash-for-work and cash transfers into a 
broader, multisectoral development funding mechanism.  
Targeting approaches in Niger 
SSNs are not systematically managed in Niger and it is difficult therefore to get a 
comprehensive picture of coverage and therefore evaluate the success of different targeting 
methods: 
x National approaches include geographical targeting using the national early warning 
system to identify people at risk (for example child nutrition see Table 5), but given 
the rate of poverty most people in rural areas are in need of SSNs support in some 
form. Inadequate household data means that, depending on the remit of a particular 
programme, there is high risk of both excluding intended beneficiaries as well as 
inclusion errors.  
x Geographical targeting in Niger has also been problematic in that poor 
administrative systems mean that population estimates are often inaccurate and 
hence distort planning. In cases of severe crisis, such as the recent drought in the 
Sahel, sensitivity targeting would be meaningless as the whole region is affected. 
Save the Children has used local communities to determine eligibility criteria, for 
example for a pilot project in 2008-2009 (Saulle et al. 2012). This participatory 
approach helped locals to understand and accept the selection process.  
x Decentralised approaches have been used by some local NGOs to identify people 
that are ‘missed’ by national schemes framed by emergency relief and risk 
management approaches. A Christian NGO Jeunesse En Mission Entraide et 
Développement (JEMED) combined a cash-for-work scheme with sales of food and 
fodder at reduced prices to support longer-term development activities and land 
regeneration among pastoralist groups in Abalak, northern Niger (Woodke, 2012).  
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People engaged in the cash-for-work programme were much more resilient to 
shocks from drought and losing crops than other people in the area. 
 
Given the prevalence of multi-deprivational poverty in Niger, leakage is relatively low. The 
more concerning issue is scoping need and ensuring sufficient funding and programme 
management capacity is in place to minimise under-coverage.  
 
Case Study: Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone had the lowest Human Development Index in the world in 2002-2003 and is the 
lowest of the 57 COMCEC countries, while its current GNP per capita is only US$130 
compared to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa of US$470 (World Bank, 2013). Sierra 
Leone has been recovering from a devastating ten-year civil war which ended in 2002 with 
need to restore and develop services providing for basic needs. Despite Sierra Leone's 
economic growth rate skyrocketing to 19.8 per cent in 2012, persistent inequalities are 
tremendous within the country. 
The welfare sector of Sierra Leone is heavily depending on international assistance. The 
World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), European Commission (EC), UK Government 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations are key donors 
supporting the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the Social Safety Net 
Programmes. Most aid is provided in the form of project support, but a significant amount is 
also provided in the form of direct support for government budgets. A central objective of 
the SSNs in Sierra Leone is to assist the old and needy in such a way that it increases their 
sense of citizenship participation and integration into community life (Child Frontiers, 2010). 
Social Safety Nets in Sierra Leone 
x Typical SSN programmes in Sierra Leone: cash transfers, targeted non-contributory 
programmes and in-kind transfers (education, food and nutrition support). 
x Providers: Government-led social protection and international donors and NGO-led 
programmes.  
x Total SSN expenditure 0.2% of GDP. 
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A number of social safety net programmes, including a small number of cash transfers 
(direct cash transfers and cash-for-work) are being implemented by the government in 
partnerships with international actors. These include direct social assistant programmes (in 
the form of in-kind assistance, food aid etc.), agricultural input programmes, food-for-work, 
skills training and start-up capital kits. The basic idea of this kind of assistance is not to give 
hand-outs, but “a hand up”. 
There are currently six cash transfer programmes being implemented in the country 
(Holmes and Jackson, 2007, 9): 
x a contributory pension scheme implemented by the National Social Security and 
Insurance Trust (NASSIT); 
x a direct cash transfer to the elderly and most vulnerable implemented by the 
Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations;  
x a cash-for-work programme is implemented by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and 
it is meant for unemployed youth aged 15-35, refugees in Freetown and ex-
combatants with little or no education. Participants are paid approximately US$2 a 
day (Scott, 2008, Cited in Unicef, 2009, 24). 
x cash-for-work by the National Commission for Social Action. The programme 
supports peace-building and it targets unemployed youth, women and handicapped. 
The public infrastructure works are carried out through local contractors and 
community participation. 
x a small scale cash-for-work programme implemented by an NGO; 
x a small scale pension programme for double amputees, also implemented by an 
NGO. 
 
Targeting Approaches in Sierra Leone 
In addition to non-contributory cash transfers and cash-for-work programmes, there are 
numerous other forms of SSNs in Sierra Leone. Table 6 shows the methodology for targeting 
different types of social safety nets. Many of these programmes use categories of the 
vulnerable to target: amputees, single female parents, widowers, unmarried single girls, the 
aged, street children, child soldiers, homeless, polio victims, slum dwellers, orphans and 
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discharged prisoners (Holmes and Jackson, 2007, 7). This can lead to high levels of exclusion 
of people suffering from poverty that do not fall into one of these classifications and hence 
SSNs under-coverage.  
Table 6: Targeting methods of SSNs in Sierra Leone 
Type of social safety net Targeting Methods Target Population 
Cash transfer Geographical targeting and tests of 
available support 
The elderly and most vulnerable  
 
Cash for work Defined eligibility criteria Ex-combatants 
Unemployed youth 
Returnees 
Refugees 
Food for work Geographical targeting Able-bodied men and women 
 
Food for training Geographical targeting with 
eligibility criteria 
Refugees 
Food for aid Geographical targeting with 
eligibility criteria  
Most vulnerable: Orphans, Widows 
with children, Malnourished children, 
the chronically ill, Disabled, Elderly, 
PLWHA 
School meals Geographical targeting Children attending school 
 
School fee subsidies Universal All school-aged children 
 
In kind and secondary 
education scholarships 
Geographical targeting and exam 
success criteria 
Girls ($77 per girl per year) 
 
In-kind transfers tend to target the most vulnerable (the elderly, disabled) on the basis that 
they have no other form of support and cannot work. Programmes which aim to build 
sustainable livelihoods through increased production or jobs target the poor with available 
labour, such as ex-combatants and other vulnerable and poor youth. A mix of targeting 
methods are used, including community targeting, but lack of monitoring makes it difficult 
to understand the extent of leakages and exclusion in these programmes (Holmes and 
Jackson, 2007, 16). Richards et al. (2004) argue that targeting categories of people through 
social status differences (e.g. based on gender, age etc. as many social protection 
programmes do) is unhelpful in addressing the root causes of social exclusion and 
discrimination in Sierra Leone because poverty and vulnerability also lie in unequal social 
relationships amid ruling and dependent lineages. 
A pilot cash transfer programme, the National Social Safety Net Programmes, was launched 
by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security in 2007 and administered by the Social 
Safety Net Committee. The programme aimed at targeting elderly and most vulnerable 
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people who have absolutely no other means of support, do not have regular income and are 
unable to work. The methodology adopted for targeting the direct cash transfers involves 
local Chiefdom Committees comprising of local traditional leaders (and input from 
pastors/imams), who make assessments of individuals’ needs. Community targeting was 
chosen because it was assumed that local people are best in understanding the life 
conditions of the targeted people and communities also have a right to decide what they 
want for their elderly (Farrington et al. 2007). Those selected for the programme receive 
around Le 200,000 (approximately US$63) every half a year (Holmes and Jackson, 2007). 
The observed benefits of the programme included an increased sense of community 
ownership of the project, reduced street begging, increased sales in local businesses on 
payment days, and now 73% of the recipients hardly go with less than two meals a day 
(Mansaray, Kamara and Conteh, 2008). Of about 16,900 persons reached through the 
programme, 95% of them were extremely poor, 65% chronically ill, 35% disabled or had no 
ability for self-help, 70% were widowed (Mansaray, Kamara and Conteh, 2008). In this 
sense, targeting appeared to be successful, although given the high prevalence of need, it 
would have been hard for it to fail.  
In Sierra Leone under-coverage is as serious as SSNs leakage. Exclusion appears to be more 
common than corrupted inclusion. For example, former female combatants were excluded 
from the cash-for-work youth programme because they were perceived to be less 
threatening to peace and the provided type of work was traditionally done by men (Holmes 
and Jackson, 2007, 16). People were also excluded if they had anyone who could take care 
of them – using social relationships to determine eligibility is extremely challenging and 
time-consuming, without necessarily leading to targeting the right recipients (Holmes and 
Jackson, 2008, 4; 2007). Challenges of verification and evaluation of the programme through 
focus-group discussions also found, despite the positive impacts of the scheme, almost 
every respondent believed the selection of beneficiaries was unfair and that the criteria for 
eligibility were not adopted. There were also concerns that full payments were not always 
passed onto recipients (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2011).   
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Leakage through misappropriation (so some of the funds are used for another purpose) is a 
serious concern in countries where governance is poor. Given the low ranking of Sierra 
Leone in the Transparency International's (2013) Corruption Perception Index (123rd out of 
176 listed countries and territories in 2012), mechanisms of monitoring transparency are 
vital in defining the success of the cash transfer programmes in the country. Lack of 
infrastructure and limited banking services in rural areas can result in large sums of money 
being transferred through informal networks (by hand) or via the bank accounts of the few 
who have them. Identifying misappropriation as a risk is key for addressing the problem and 
increasing confidence of donors in programmes (Harvey, 2007, cited in Holmes and Jackson, 
2008, 3). Some steps of progress have already been made in tackling misappropriation. 
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) provide mechanisms for accountability in 
Government Departments, and a private company was hired to set up delivering systems of 
scholarships and increase public trust on the process. Stronger monitoring mechanisms with 
checkpoints for transparency and accountability are however still needed to build strong 
governance.  
 
Case Study: Mozambique 
Poverty in Mozambique is pervasive with more than half of the population living below the 
poverty line, and almost half off the under-five children chronically malnourished. Poverty is 
higher in the rural north and in central regions (74%), while the southern cities have a much 
lower, 16%, poverty rate. There is little difference in consumption among the four lowest 
income quintiles. Agriculture, primarily in the form of subsistence farming, accounts for 
around 80% of the Mozambicans' primary income. As a consequence of AIDS epidemic, 42% 
of Mozambican children live with only one biological parent. Households living in chronic 
food insecurity are characterised most typically with an elder head of household (20%), 
woman head of household (12%), having a disabled family member (11%), chronically ill 
family member (5%) and a recent death of a family member (4%), (World Bank, 2012b,  
2013c). 
 
40% of Mozambique's budget in 2012 was foreign assistance. The decade up to the year 
2012 saw economic growth of 6 to 8% each year and natural resources are expected to fuel 
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further growth in the future as well. The government of Mozambique spends 0.7% of its 
GDP on social assistance (excluding health care and schooling) (World Bank, 2013c, 3). If 
donor aid and spending on education and health care are included, the figure raises up to 
3.8% in 2010. A further 2% of GDP is spent on pensions and more than 1% on fuel and other 
subsidies. Mozambique has also managed to reduce poverty with the help of raising private 
sector investment in social and economic infrastructure. 
 
Social Safety Nets Programmes in Mozambique 
x Typical SSN programmes in Mozambique: cash transfers, targeted non-contributory 
programmes and in-kind transfers (education, food and nutrition support). 
x Providers: Government-led SSN programmes (40) and international NGO-led 
programmes.  
x Total SSN expenditure 0.7% of GDP. 
 
Table 7 shows that forty social safety net programmes are implemented by the government 
and other agencies. The government has also recently passed legislation on social 
protection. The main executer of government programmes is the National Institute for 
Social Action (INAS) under the management of the Ministry for Women and Social Action 
(MMAS). The National Basic Social Security Strategy (ENNSB) is a framework for social 
security nets in the country and covers: 
 
x Basic Social Action (Basic Social Subsidy Programme): cash transfers and social 
assistance, for groups like the elderly, disable and chronically ill 
x Educational Social Action: programmes to increase school attendance  
x Health Social Action: nutrition and other health programmes  
x Productive Social Action Program: public works and income generating schemes 
(World Bank, 2013c, 5). 
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Table 7: Social Safety Nets Programme, Population at Risk and Programme Coverage 2010 
 
 Population at risk Coverage  Classification 
0-5 years        
Micronutrients Vitamin A  3.6 million 6-59 months  4 million  High 
Micronutrients Vitamin A  979,087 post birth  1.2 million  High 
Iron/ Folic Acid  979,087 post birth  1.4 million  High 
Deworming  3.6 million 6-59 months)  3.5 million  High 
Nutrition Rehabilitation Program 
(MISAU/WFP)  1,722,573 chronic  84,3009/ 13,806 res.  Low  
Social Units for Young    574 children Low  
Children OVC (INAS)        
Kinder (Centros Infantis e Escolinha) 
(MMAS)  2,723,164 no stimulation  69,312 Low  
National Birth Registration Plan (DNRN/ 
MINJUS/ Holland/UNICEF)  2,723,459 children  699,622 Low  
6-17 years old        
Direct Support to Schools (ME/EOE)  
343,239 (112,043 boys and 232,196 
girls) (6-12) not in primary school  
5.2 million  Low  
944,164 (396,774 boys; 547,390 girls) 
(13-17) not in secondary school  
School Books (1-7 grades, ME)) (EOE)    14.2m books   
School Feeding (ME/PMA) (EOE)    421,034   
Child-Friendly Schools (UNICEF)    370,000   
Action Plan for OVC (UNICEF)  
2,061,866 OVC  
252,258/ 242,000  Low  
1,447,053 Orphans both parents  
Support to OVC (MMAS/WFP)    48,937 Low  
Children with Disabilities (MMAS)  
65,000 abandoned children  
2,834 with disabilities  Low  
1,381,036 child labor  
6.2 million with disabilities,  
1000 women/children trafficked/ 
year  
Special Education (ME)    74,000 children  Low  
18-24 years old        
Institute for Study Grants /Other 
Scholarships (EOE)  887,440 poor youth (Q1+Q2)  
1200 internal/ 1000 
external  Low  
Youth Initiatives Fund (MJD)    139 projects  Low  
Geração Biz (MJD/ME/MINSAU/ UNFPA)    54,000 Low  
25 -59 years old        
Income Generation (INAS)  4.2 million working poor  12,072 persons  Low  
Social Benefit for Work (INAS)    4,029 persons  Low  
Adult Education (ME)  5.9 million (15+) illiterate  1.1 million  Medium 
INEFP (EOE)    8,555 trained  Low  
Agricultural input vouchers 
IFDC/USAID/FAO/EU)  
3.7 million small farms : 92% no TA 
97% no credit  20,260 Low  
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 Population at risk Coverage  Classification 
60 years and over        
INSS (2009)  900,000 (60+) no pension  13,773 Low  
MOF pensões (civil/militares)  175,000 civil servants  universal  High 
PSA (INAS)  305,000 (60+ Q1)  217,683 direct  Low  
Social Service Institutions and Old Age 
Homes (INAS)  305,372 (60+) in Q1+Q2  835 Low  
Households in General        
Direct Social Assistance (INAS)  5 million in Q1  26,628 Low  
HIV and AIDS Program (PMTCT) (MISAU)  150,000 pregnant HIV+/ year;  32,676 Low  
Basic Food Basket for People in ART 
(ART/MISAU)  500,000 adults in need of ART  3,500 Low  
Support to People with Chronic Illnesses 
(WFP)    30,000 Low  
Social Units for the Handicap (INAS)  1.6 million people w/disabilities  303 Low  
Women Entrepreneurship (MMAS/ADB) 
(EOE)    4,500 Low  
Community Development (INAS)  
HH 2.6m no improved water; 3.7m 
improved sanitation; 4m no 
electricity  
49,852 Low  
Risk Reduction (INGC/WFP)    4,000 HH Low  
Climate Change Adaptation (INGC /WFP)    400/500 districts Low  
Source: World Bank, 2012b. 
 
Targeting Approaches in Mozambique 
The above table shows that 88% 0f SSNs programmes have low coverage targeting small 
number of population. Mozambique's SSNs tend to be inefficient at targeting and encounter 
implementation difficulties due to poor institutional capability. There is also very limited 
monitoring. Identifying the poorest of the poor is particularly challenging in Mozambique 
because of flat consumption expenditure across income quintiles (World Bank, 2012b, 88). 
There is a large informal labour market, which along with subsistence farming makes it 
difficult to use income or consumption based targeting approaches.  
 
x Geographic Targeting tends to be used for food-for-work and direct social support 
programmes in areas of drought or disasters. Given the levels of poverty in 
Mozambique, this is unlikely to result in leakage to non-eligible people. 
x Community Targeting based on defined eligibility criteria and identification by the 
Project Team/community leaders: The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) aims 
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to target permanently labour constrained households which have no able-bodied 
workers or other source of income, with recipients identified by the project team 
and community leaders and not through self-registration, even though they had little 
nuanced understanding of the eligibility criteria (in part as programme 
documentation was poor). Applying eligibility criteria can work well when there is 
good knowledge of the fundamental principles and rules by both administrators and 
target populations. Where this is not the case there are inevitably errors in targeting. 
In relation to Mozambique, community leaders and project workers face a lot of 
political and social pressure to include non-eligible people as beneficiaries. 
Insufficient budget allocation was also found to be a common reason for not 
including eligible people on the recipient list. Poor administration, such as a lack of 
electronic databases on recipients and the requirement for ID cards to be presented 
for registration even though many elderly people may not have birth certificates, 
caused additional issues around eligibility and transparency. 
x Where programmes do not involve self-selection, but people are identified by the 
administrative team, local people can be unaware that cash transfers are their right 
or entitlement and not a gift. In these situations, they may not know if there are 
delays in payment or money disappearing, leaving programmes open to 
misappropriation of funds. In the case of Mozambique, both lack of understanding of 
the targeted community and no monitoring of the accuracy of community targeting 
results in leakage and under-coverage. The fear of reprisal also suffocated some 
complaints (Selvester et al. 2012, 36-39). 
 
The INAS understands that targeting through set income thresholds is not appropriate for 
Mozambique, but the current way of distributing money is not efficient. The World Bank has 
recently proposed a new project which intends to use geographical and community-based 
targeting, accompanied with a verification system and more emphasis of resources on the 
countryside. The most substantial risks for the programme are governance and capacity of 
the implementing agency.  
 
In its earlier research, the World Bank (2012b) found that programmes which were designed 
as pro-poor did not necessarily reduce poverty or improve inequality. The Food Subsidy 
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Program (Programa Subsidio de Alimentos, PSA) targeted the elderly, pregnant women who 
could not work, people with chronic illnesses and disabilities (World Bank, 2012b, 87). The 
Direct Social Support Program (Programa Apoio Social Directo, PASD) provides support 
against shocks, such as death, illness, house fire or unemployment. In addition, it supports 
orphans and vulnerable children. Both the PASD and PSA were found to be progressive, but 
while PSA was found to be pro-poor to a minor extent, PASD was not pro-poor due to errors 
of inclusion and exclusion caused by issues with the targeting approach.  Many of the 
current benefits are regressive and risk contributing to further inequality. For example, only 
7 per cent of the pension scheme recipients were from the two lowest income quintiles 
while 74 per cent were from the top two quintiles (91). Universal safety-nets, such as fuel 
subsidies are also regressive and not pro-poor. 
 
Case Study : Nigeria  
Nigeria is ranked 153rd on the Human Development Index. 54% of Nigerians live below the 
national poverty line, although it is classified as a lower middle income country due to oil 
reserves which account for 95% of foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of budgetary 
revenues. Despites its wealth (US$59 billion was earned from oil in 2010), the country 
suffers from poor governance and poor institutional capabilities. Very few improvements 
have taken place in terms of standards of living in recent years and 70% of the labour force 
still works in the agricultural sector (Moyo and Songwe, 2012; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003).  
Social protection comes in three forms in Nigeria: social assistance, social insurance and 
social services. A National Poverty Reduction Programme controls and monitors all poverty 
eradication activities in Nigeria, although social assistance programmes receive limited 
emphasis in Federal level expenditure (Note there is no state level data available.) Social 
expenditure comprises around 0.6% of GDP and 2% of consolidated government spending, 
of which social security schemes received around half of the all reserves for social 
protection (Gavrilovic et al. 2011, 83).  
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Social Safety Nets in Nigeria 
x Typical SSN programmes in Nigeria: cash transfers, targeted non-contributory 
programmes and in-kind transfers (education, food and nutrition support). 
x Providers: Government-led social protection and international donors and NGO-led 
programmes.  
x Total SSN expenditure 0.5% of GDP. 
 
Nigeria has a number of targeted programmes. Care for People (COPE) is a contributory cash 
transfer programme established as a pilot in 2007. It was designed and implemented by the 
National Poverty Reduction Programme with the help of local level actors. COPE aims at 
breaking the intergenerational transfer of poverty by providing a monthly Basic Income 
Guarantee of US$10-30 for one year. A month of compulsory savings of US$50 (maximum 
US$560) is delivered as a lump sum to the head of the household. The programme targets 
children in primary school age, households lead by poor females, aged, disabled people, 
patients with vesicovaginal fistula illness and HIV/AIDS patients (NAPEP, 2013). So far the 
programme has reached only 22,000 households (Holmes et al. 2012b, 21). 
In order to receive the cash transfers, recipients had to fulfil the following conditions: 1) 
children of the household enroll and attend school with 80% attendance rates; 2) the head 
of the household participates in vocational skills training and health and sanitation 
programmes; 3) children under-five participate in immunisation programmes. The 
programme had reportedly a high compliance rate of around 80% and the majority of non-
compliance stemmed from acceptable reasons, such as illness. 
A range of different schemes and subsidies exist in different sectors, but they are not 
systematically managed. In Jigawa, disabled persons are entitled to a social security 
allowance of N7,000 (approximately $46) per month. Even though primary education is free 
in Nigeria, in practice schooling requires many additional fees. Adamawa SUBEB offers free 
uniforms for girls, while HIV and AIDS programmes assist with indirect school costs (books, 
uniforms, exam registration, school meals, transportation etc.) by providing free waivers 
and other support (Holmes et al. 2012b, 23). Free school meals are provided by some NGOs, 
but unlike in many other countries, Nigeria does not have a national free school meal 
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programme. Likewise Nigeria does not have any nationally led nutrition programme, re lying 
instead on emergency nutrition instead of the root causes of malnutrition. 
One of the most important health subsidies programmes is the Maternal and Child Health 
Care (MCH) which was established in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of 
reducing under-five mortality and improving maternal health. It offers free health checks, 
immunisation, help in child delivery and caesarian sections. Targeting is universal but the 
poor benefit particularly because of their disproportionately high rates of child and 
maternal mortality. The challenge, however, is that many states have not allocated 
sufficient funding to replace the finished central funding. The programme was successful in 
saving lives of women and children, but the funding allowed only a small coverage of the 
programme (Gavrilovic et al. 2011).  
Nigeria lacks an overarching strategy for cash-for-work programmes (Holmes et al. 2012b, 
27). The status of the existing schemes, such as the National Job Creation Scheme, is 
unclear. So far most of the schemes have emphasised machine-intensive and contractor-
conducted works, whereas the International Labour Organization has tried to encourage 
Nigeria to accommodate schemes which would be more focused on community labour. 
US$300 million of funding for the Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSOI) 
will provide skills training, cash transfers and employment to 18 to 35 year-olds who 
represent the 10 per cent of the poorest households (The World Bank, 2013). However, the 
funds involve will not go very far in such a large country.  
Targeting approaches in Nigeria 
Though SSN programmes in Nigeria deserve some credit for their focus on including the 
formerly excluded and their aim to cover the basic needs of the most marginalised (girls, 
women, disadvantaged groups), there are numerous challenges in their execution. The 
reach and effectiveness of SSNs is determined by the targeting approaches used and a range 
of inhibiting factors, include institutional capacity and pervasive misappropriation.  
Different programmes have used the following targeting approaches: 
x Targeting under COPE is geographical and community-based. A community 
development committee identifies the recipients with the help of, for example, a 
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headmaster of a school, women leaders, religious leaders or social welfare officers. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the targeting mechanism of community mapping, 
used also by COPE, is prone to elite capture. Generally SSN programme designs in 
the country have been limited in terms of child sensitivity and focus on equity 
(Holmes et al., 2012b, 53; Gavrilovic et al. 2011, 88). In addition, the structure of the 
COPE programmeis not considered to be the most suitable for households with 
labour constraints. 
x Proxy means testing has been used with a pilot programme in Kano, Buchi and 
Katsina, which will run from 2011 to 2014 and is aimed at improving the school 
staying-on rate of girls. The scope of the programme is determined by the availability 
of the school infrastructure. Participants in cities are selected using proxy means 
testing, while in rural areas they are selected by the programme management units 
(Holmes et al. 2012b, 22).  
x Selection by lottery has been used in the State of Bayelsa to select beneficiaries of a 
cash transfer programme that provides awards to junior secondary school students - 
the Bayelsa Child Development Account: Savings, Training and Rewarding Saver.  
x Community-Based Health Insurances (CBHIs) offer communities a chance to select 
suitable insurance appropriate to local community structures and arrangements. It is 
targeted at self-employed people from remote areas who cannot usually access 
insurance. The target group is relatively small low-income earners, which means the 
funding base of the insurances is dependable on donors (Health Finance Nigeria, 
2013, 2). 
x Nigeria has moved away from universal fuel subsidies, due to the increasing cost. 
Some subsidies still operate in rural areas and will benefit those who purchase the 
goods they apply to. For example Federal policy offers a 25% subsidy under the 
Fertiliser Market Stabilisation Programme and there are also a few other subsidies 
for agriculture in various States.  
 
Social protection is fragmented across the country, functions on an ad hoc basis, and its 
actors do not coordinate with each other enough (Holmes et al. 2012b, 52). While there is a 
risk of duplication, the far greater concern is one of under-coverage. Only a narrow set of 
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social protection instruments is implemented, while the existing programmes reach only a 
fraction of the poor. Programmes on employment generation and income security in turn 
have generally been poorly targeted with limited coverage, missing evaluations and 
insufficient funding (World Bank, 2013b). The coverage of SSNs has been estimated to be 
less than 0.001% of the poor. There are several reasons for this. Nigeria suffers from 
extremely poor governance and implementation capability and misappropriation is 
pervasive, suggesting that where opportunities exist there is misappropriation and funding 
leakage (Chuckwu, Ogunniran and Onyegu , 2009).   
The World Bank (2013b) considers COPE to be the first well-targeted and well-resourced 
SSNs that has been implemented both at the national and state levels in Nigeria. Holmes et 
al. (2012b) argue that, although COPE encompasses a wide range of goals (education, health 
and investment), it covers only a narrow group of people. The small scale of COPE leaves its 
effect without palpable change (Dijkstra, 2011a, 2011b). On the other hand, COPE has been 
very helpful in meeting the immediate needs for consumption and schooling, but the cash 
amount is often too small for large families of even 20 members (polygamous households in 
the north. Originally COPE was intended to accommodate the basic needs of ten members 
per household but the head number was reduced down to five family members because of 
budget constraints. Overall, conditional cash transfers improve access to services, but as in 
other countries health and education outcomes will only improve if service quality is good. 
 
Case Study: Egypt 
Egypt is a lower middle income country with a long history of social safety nets dating back 
to the 19th century. Though the rural poverty rate is 32.3% and that of the urban areas 
15.3%, the occurrence of extreme poverty is rare, at only 1.7%. Poverty is not only a rural 
phenomenon but poverty increased sharply across the country between 2009 and 2011 
(WFP, 2013a). As a result of global food, fuel and financial crises during recent years, food 
insecurity has risen from 14% of the population in 2009 to 17.2% (13.7 million people) in 
2011. 15.2% of the population moved into poverty between 2009 and 2011, while only 7.7% 
moved out of poverty. 12.6% of people remain in chronic long term poverty. Poverty is 
disproportionately high in Upper Egypt (51.5% of the population) compared to the national 
average of 25.2 per cent (El Gaafarawi, 2013). 
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Social Safety Nets in Egypt 
x Typical SSN programmes in Egypt: cash transfers, targeted non-contributory 
programmes and in-kind transfers and universal subsidies (education, food and 
nutrition support). 
x Providers: Government-led social protection and international NGO-led programmes.  
x Total SSN expenditure 1.6% of GDP. 
 
Social spending in Egypt is high but is not necessarily effective. Two-thirds of Egyptians 
consider the current SSN programmes to be ineffective. 6% of GDP is reserved for universal 
fuel subsidies, while 2% is reserved for universal bread subsidy and ration cards for staples 
like sugar and oil. In total this equates to almost as much as funding for education and 
health. Cash transfers receive only 0.2% of GDP. As in many Middle Eastern and North 
African countries, the generosity of governments in the form of subsidies has not 
empowered citizens to prepare for better livelihoods. 23 per cent of Egyptians have 
indicated that they are not aware of any SSN programmes in the country, despite universal 
food and fuel subsidies (Silva, Levin and Morgandi, 2013).  
 
Social safety nets in Egypt aim to protect vulnerable groups from economic shocks, secure 
the basic survival of those who are unemployable and build capabilities to the employable 
poor. Egypt offers various types and levels of social housing and children from poor families 
are entitled to various waivers and school allowances. There are several credit programmes, 
such as those offered by the Social Fund for Development (SFD), Nasser Social Bank and the 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. These offer a wide range of micro credits and social 
loans for family emergencies. SFD is the most pro-poor, while the others are fragmented in 
their efforts and do not reach the poorest people. The Productive Family Project provides 
training, micro loans and marketing opportunities for women headed households, recent 
graduates and families entitled to cash transfers. Vocational training centres target school 
drop-outs (El Gaafarawi, 2013). 
 
 
 
47 | P a g e  
 
Targeting Approaches in Egypt 
Cash transfers, food and fuel subsidies and ration cards in Egypt all have high leakages and 
are subject to misappropriation. Cash transfers’ targeting methods have been criticised for 
not sufficiently emphasising vulnerable groups in the design and implementation of 
categorical targeting, resulting in under-coverage. On average, the richest quintile receive 9 
per cent of non-subsidy SSNs in Egypt while the poorest receive 31 per cent (Silva, Levin and 
Morgandi, 2013, 123, figure 3.10). A move towards a targeting mechanism for cash transfers 
based on proxy means testing may improve targeting rates, but this has yet to be fully 
applied.  
 
x Food subsidies and ration cards alleviate poverty rates. However both suffer from 
significant leakage. 73% of non-poor households have ration cards, whereas 19% of 
poor households do not. Universal food subsidies result in the richest income 
quintile receiving 12.6% more food subsidies than the poorest quintile because of 
the generally higher consumption of the upper class (World Bank, 2010a). Non-poor 
people benefit from food subsidies to the value of LE 281 per year, whereas the 
equivalent for persons in poor households is LE 273 (WFP, 2013a). Yet while rich 
people receive more, the poor spend a greater share of their income on food. While 
food subsidies, especially that on baladi bread, have a large poverty impact, there is 
inefficiency in targeting. Though food subsidies lifted 9% of citizens from poverty in 
2008/09, the programme had high leakages and under-coverage such that 28% is 
estimated at not reaching intended - recipients. Low regulated prices often results in 
food goods being sold in parallel markets. 
 
x The targeting of social assistance and the food subsidy programme is particularly 
inefficient in rural areas (Korayem, 2013). The social assistance programme ignores 
geographical differences in the prevalence of poverty, as urban governorates receive 
more subsidies than high-in-poverty rural governorates. Coverage could be improved 
with more narrowed geographical targeting and governorates with higher 
occurrence of poverty receiving more. 
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x Some argue that food subsidies are self-targeting in that rich people in cities prefer 
to buy better quality bread rather than subsidised baladi bread (14-5). On the 
contrary, subsidised sugar, oil and baladi wheat flour are not considered inferior 
among the rich. It is also noteworthy that baladi bread consumption specifically is 
not dependable on income in rural areas . 
 
x Improving targeting has been recommended by the World Bank (2010a) on the basis 
that 21 per cent of the poor do not benefit from subsidised baladi bread, 80 per cent 
do not receive subsidised wheat flour and 27 per cent do not receive ration cards. 
Improved efficacy would be cost neutral if the richest 40% of the population were 
excluded. However, the challenge of reforming or removing food subsidies from any 
particular group is highly political - opposition to subsidy reform is around 60 per 
cent in Egypt. Nevertheless, pilot programmes have recently been implemented to 
shift the subsidy on baladi flour the raw material to the final product (El-Fiqi, 2013). 
Instead of fixing the price of flour (which is then re-sold on the black market), 
bakeries now buy flour at unregulated market prices and sell bread at a low LE 0.05 
per loaf, receiving compensation direct from the government for the increased flour 
price. When implemented in Cairo, bakeries went to a strike because of implantation 
issues. Issues remain about how to implement a targeting system that identifies the 
poor, such as the distribution of food stamps or coupons on the basis of proxy means 
testing which could reduce rather than eradicate leakage, or with self-targeting 
(where universal subsidy is designed such that only the poor access goods). 
 
x According to Korayem (2013), a high inflation rate in Egypt makes in-kind assistance 
a better option compared to cash transfers. However, targeting in-kind assistance is 
difficult and it is liable to abuse and misuse. A report by the World Food Programme 
(WFP, 2013) argues that social assistance programmes in urban areas should focus 
on stabilising real incomes and reducing inequalities, while targeting in rural areas 
should focus on structural reforms addressing chronic poverty. Several reforms are 
taking place at the moment, such as broadening the coverage of social and health 
insurances (El Gaafarawi, 2013). In addition, a database is being developed to 
identify the poor using proxy means testing with scoring and smart cards for 
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identification purposes to improve SSNs targeting systems. Consideration is also 
being given to introducing emergency cash transfer programmes based on 
geographical targeting and identification of female headed poor households. 
 
x The benefits of universal fuel subsidies mainly accrue to the upper-class, as almost 
60% goes to the top two quintiles. Though leakages are high, fuel subsidies made an 
18% contribution to decreases in poverty in 2004.  Egypt is currently in negotiation 
with the IMF over a $4.8 billion loan, which would be conditional upon a reduction in 
fuel subsidies. Negotiations have already failed once in April 2013 and many civil 
society actors are generally critical of whether Egypt even needs a loan, and object 
to new pieces of legislation which could favour large local and foreign capital-holders 
(Bretton Woods Project, 2013). 
 
x The Islamic Zakat charity manages to reach only 5 to 6% of the poorest Egyptians 
while only 26% of all Zakat monies actually reach the poor (Silva, Levin and 
Morgandi, 2013, 126, figure 3.11), indicating that the Zakat system has not managed 
to be particularly pro-poor in Egypt. Where it does reach the poor, Zakat does not 
serve all the purposes of SSNs, such as increasing resilience or human capital but 
tends to be short-term support. 
 
Case Study: Senegal 
Senegal belongs to the group of lower-middle income countries, although the country is 
heavily depends on donor aid due to the global recession and food and fuel price crises 
which hit the country in 2008-2009. Moreover, poor rains and then floods have caused 
further damage over the last few years. Approximately 75% of people in rural areas live in 
chronic poverty. 
Senegal has a low HDI. Social mobility is very limited in Senegal and a person's poverty 
status is likely to stay the same throughout his or her life (Wadugodapitiya, 2011). Although 
poverty has declined gradually, its extreme form has actually more than doubled during 
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2000s (World Bank, 2013f, i). In 2011, 46.7% of Senegalese lived below the national poverty 
line (IMF, 2013c, 2). 
Children under five years of age are much more often affected by poverty in rural areas 
where a quarter of them live in extreme poverty, as opposed to the low 3% suffering 
extreme child poverty in urban areas (Schnitzer, 2011, 9). Household size is the strongest 
determinant of poverty rates in countryside, while the relationship is weaker in urban areas. 
While families with more than 15 members account for only 35.5% of the rural population, 
their poverty rate reaches 71.8%. At the same time, similar size families represent 20.9% of 
the urban population but have a poverty rate of 53.2%. In terms of child poverty, the worst 
situation is in the rural areas of the Kedougou district in which 96 per cent of households 
with at least one under-five child live in poverty. Rural areas of Tambacounda follow closely 
behind with a 91% poverty rate for families with under-fives. 
 
Social Safety Nets in Senegal 
x Typical SSN programmes in Senegal: subsidies, cash transfers, targeted non-
contributory programmes, in-kind transfers (education, food and nutrition support). 
x Providers: Mostly dependent on international NGO and donor agencies including World 
Bank, UNICEF and WFO). 
x Total SSN expenditure 0.6% of GNP but across all programmes is not known: estimates 
are that 27% are government funded and donor agencies finance 62% (World Bank 
2013f).  
 
Senegal does not have well-developed and institutionalised social protection programmes. 
Previous responses to natural disasters by the Government include dept-forgiveness and 
subsidies which mainly benefitted those who already had access to credit schemes and had 
higher levels of consumption. For example, the poorest 20% of the population benefitted 
only from an 8% share of water subsidies and a 7% of subsidised electricity. Subsidies 
accounted for 10% of all government spending and 2.4% of GDP in 2008.  
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However, 6.2% of Senegalese are covered by a formal pension programme, while 3% receive 
social security administration benefits and another 3% have at least some form of health 
insurance (World Bank, 2013f, i). However, these Social Security Nets (SSNs) are 
unreachable for the poor and people working in the informal sector.  
There is a wide range of SSNs available in Senegal in addition to subsidies, as shown in Table 
8, although there are no public works programmes. Around a quarter of Senegalese receive 
some form of SSNs benefit. The Food Security Commissariat and the National School 
Feeding Programme provide the overwhelming majority of this support, together 
accounting for 97% (World Bank, 2013j, iv). The rest of the SSNs, combined together, reach 
only about 100,000 people which mainly consisted of WFP cash voucher programmes and 
the Cash Transfers for Child Nutrition Programme. 
 
Targeting Approaches in Senegal 
Currently Senegal is still at a learning stage in terms of information gathering and trying to identify 
the best targeting mechanisms for different programmes and target groups. This is being informed 
by analysis of current approaches. The 2011 ESPS Household Survey (Echevin, 2012) studied the 
spread of various SSNs benefits according to income quintiles and the rural/urban division. The 
survey found that youth employment, nutritional reinforcement (PRN), and agricultural 
development (GOANA) all managed to target the lowest two quintiles (Echevin, 2012). On 
the contrary, half of the food aid recipients were not poor, while more than 70% of 
scholarships were granted to non-poor. Elderly health care was not pro-poor either with half 
of the benefits accruing to the non-poor with a strong urban emphasis. A sharp division 
between income groups in case of housing refers to differences in housing type, though 
housing schemes clearly benefit the rich.  
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Table 8: Selected Social Safety Nets Programmes in Senegal  
 
Programmes 
 
Types of assistance Targets Targeting Methods Objectives 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
Food Security Commissariat  
( CSA) Food aid assistance: rice 
distribution at public 
rallies and religious 
festivals 
Vulnerable people, 
National / All the 
territory 
Categorical Response to 
catastrophes for 
Resistance to 
shock 
3 600 000 
National Solidarity Fund 
( FSN) 
Cash, medical and 
material support 
The whole population/ 
National/ Rural and 
peri-urban – victim of 
disaster 
Categorical Crisis and 
emergency 
situations for 
resistance and 
shocks 
NR 
Non renseigné 
/NC: Non 
concerné 
Community-Based Re-adaptation 
Programme ( PRBC) 
Grant and material 
support and funding of 
income generation 
activities-  
 
Disabled people/ 
National / All the 
territory 
 
Categorical Social integration NR 
Non renseigné 
/NC: Non 
concerné 
Old Age Support Programme 
(PAPA) 
Capacity strengthening, 
grants and subsidized 
loans for income 
generating activities; 
The vulnerable elderly 
(over 60 years)/ 
National / All the 
territory 
Categorical Social Integration Non renseigné 
/NC: Non 
concerné 
National School Lunch Programme 
(DCaS) 
Provides school lunches  All School children/ 
National/ Rural and 
peri-urban 
 
Geographical  Access to 
education 
780 000 
WFP School Lunch Program (WFP) Provides primary school 
lunches 
All regions except St 
Louis & Dakar / Rural 
and peri-urban 
Geographical 
Categorical 
Access to 
education 
596 253 
Educational Support for 
Vulnerable Children (OEV) Cash 
Orphan and  
vulnerable children/ 
National  All the 
territory 
Categorical Access to 
education: for 
children 
orphaned or 
affected by HIV-
AIDS and other 
vulnerable 
children 
4 956 
Sesame Plan (Plan Sesame) Waives health service 
fees for all persons over 
60 years 
Old people over 60/ 
National / All the 
territory 
Categorical Access to health 
services 
Non renseigné 
Poverty Reduction Programme 
(PRP) 
Loan and  grants for 
income generating 
activities 
Vulnerable groups, 
primarily women, the 
disabled and HIV-AIDS 
affected populations; 
3 regions: Matam, St 
Louis, Louga / Rural 
Categorical 
 
 
 
Geographical 
Community based 
Poverty 
Reduction 
 
3 414 
A pilot Cash Transfers for Child 
Nutrition Programme (NETS) 
Cash grants to mothers 
of vulnerable children 
Mothers of vulnerable 
children under 5 years 
old/Rural (pilot) 6 
Regions (64 rural 
communities) 
Categorical  
 
Community based 
Resistance to 
shocks : mitigate 
the negative 
impacts of food 
price increases 
26 294 
WFP Vouchers for Food Pilot 
Programme  (CV) 
Cash for food insecurity Vulnerable 
households 
Categorical 
Geographical 
Community based 
Resistance to 
shocks :alleviate 
rising food prices. 
55 000 
Social Protection Initiative for 
Vulnerable Children (IPSEV) 
UNICEF 
Cash grants to 
households for accessing 
health 
vulnerable 
children/Urban 
(pilot) 2 regions (10 
cities): Pikine, 
Ziguinchor  
 Family 
integration 
900 
Total Beneficiaries     4, 467 850 
      Compiled from the World Bank, 2013f.                                                                                                                                            
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Untargeted subsidies, categorical and geographical targeting are the most prevalent 
targeting mechanisms in Senegal: 
x Categorical targeting using demographic profiles, such as "children", "women" or 
"the elderly" has been the prevailing method in the great majority of SSN 
programmes in Senegal (Table 9). In addition, the geographical allocation of SSNs 
benefits has been popular.  This is not always effective as it makes too many 
assumptions about the vulnerability of certain groups, and risks not identifying 
those of greatest need and including some that are not ‘in need’. 
x A study by the World Bank (2013j) found that the worst leakages take place in 
programmes using only geographical targeting. The study then simulated various 
scenarios by calculating the effectiveness of proxy means testing (PMT). When PMT 
is used, targeting results improve in the majority of cases (PAPA urban, IPSEV urban 
and rural, WFP CV, NETS rural, DCas urban and rural, OEV urban, PRP, PRBC urban, 
WFP cantines urban and rural). However, PMT targeting did not offer additional 
effectiveness in the cases of PAPA rural, NETS urban (only slightly), OEV rural, PRBC 
rural.   
 
Table 9:  Distribution of Self-Declared Beneficiaries (%) 
   
Poverty Quintiles (based on household 
consumption) 
Poor or Non-
Poor 
Geographic Zone 
  Total Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 P NP Urban Rural 
Nutritional reinforcement (PRN) 100.0 28.4 37.7 23.9 9.2 1.0 65.5 34.5 5.5 94.5 
Youth employment (office banlieue) 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Agricultural development (GOANA) 100.0 31.3 32.9 24.2 9.5 2.1 62.8 37.2 5.6 94.4 
Health care for elderly (Sesame) 100.0 14.9 13.4 17.7 29.7 24.3 49.4 50.6 75.9 24.1 
Food aid 100.0 8.3 14.6 28.5 28.6 19.9 49.3 50.7 84.4 15.6 
Education (scholarships, etc.) 100.0 8.4 8.4 24.2 30.1 29.0 25.7 74.3 76.2 23.8 
Housing 100.0 29.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.3 29.7 70.3 100.0 0.0 
Source: Echevin, 2012 
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x Untargeted food and fuel subsidies: The most serious SSNs leakages in Senegal are 
related to universal subsidies on food and fuel, which are inefficient in reaching the 
poorest income quintiles in Senegal. It has been estimated that 55% of these 
benefits accrue to the 40% of the richest Senegalese (Schnitzer, 2011, 10). The cost 
of food and fuel subsidies in Senegal has reached as high as 3% of GDP, suggesting 
that it is both expensive and inefficient as a poverty reduction/risk mitigation 
strategy. As a response to the inefficiency of subsidies, alternative SSNs forms and 
targeting mechanisms are emerging (World Bank, 2013j). 
 
Moves to patch leakages mainly focus on avoiding only one type of testing (usually 
geographical or categorical on their own). The development of better targeting mechanisms 
focuses on refining an appropriate proxy means testing or finding the optimal mixed 
method. However, in addition to actual leakages due to targeting mechanisms, there are 
also other reasons for under-coverage of SSNs in Senegal, as was revealed by the 2011 ESPS 
Household Survey. The number of actual beneficiaries is a small share of all eligible people 
across SSNs types. At best, education support reached 13% of all eligible people, food aid 
reached 11.7%, agricultural development (GOANA) reached 10.7% health care for elderly 
(SESAME) reached 10.4%, nutritional reinforcement (PRN) reached 7.5%, and both youth 
employment and housing only 0.1% (Echevin, 2012). The most commonly mentioned reason 
for people not getting involved with SSN programmes regardless of their eligibility was their 
unawareness of it. The second most common reason was missing documents, followed by 
inability to get to the place to collect the benefits, government not delivering payments, and 
finally, benefits/sums of money being too small for the effort. 
In its National Strategy for Economic and Social Development for 2013-2017, Senegal clearly 
states its intention to take an ownership of the Social Protection Floor (SPF) initiative which 
aims at improving access to basic social services and increase transfers for the poorest and 
most vulnerable. Furthermore, the intention is for this to dovetail with the national strategy 
on social protection (SNPS). This includes plans to extend social protection, improve the 
pensions system and increase incentives for the empowerment and integration of the 
vulnerable groups by:  
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'establishing universal health coverage through mutual health organizations, improving 
targeting mechanisms, setting up an information and monitoring and evaluation system, 
ensuring application of the social act for the protection of persons with disabilities, 
establishing an independent fund for universal social protection and extending free 
healthcare to vulnerable groups’ (IMF, 2013:42). 
The strategy does not elaborate how this will be achieved and the cost of ensuring that 
services are in place to deliver both universal benefits and targeted ones. Currently there 
appears to be very little shared information and cooperation between different SSN 
programmes. Coverage is therefore patchy. Senegal is in a rather good position in terms of 
available information that can be used for designing more systematic targeting mechanisms. 
Household income and poverty data are made available through the Demographic and 
Health Survey (EDS) (see L’Agence Nationale de la Statistique and ICF International, 2012) 
and the national household survey (ESPS). These surveys could be a great help in designing 
proxy means testing. Information from community-targeting could also compliment the 
design of PMT. It has also become evident that targeting methods do not have to be 
mutually exclusive but mixed methods can sometimes provide excellent results. However, it 
should be noted that, although targeting is important, it is only one element of successful 
coverage and delivery. 
A Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) revealed that replacing universal subsidies with 
a cash transfer programme would be a more effective and pro-poor way to reduce the 
impact of energy and food crises (Pereznieto, 2009, 3).  
 
Recommendations for in Low Income Countries 
Establishing national, unified and overarching institutional frameworks with realistic goals is 
important in order to improve institutional capacity and capability. COMCEC member 
countries would benefit from more clearly defined responsibilities and cooperation 
structures between implementing agencies. Planning stand-alone programmes should be 
avoided as these can result in duplication. Instead, different types of SSNs and long-term 
development projects should be intertwined. Establishment of a common database for SSNs 
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in a country that would hold information about the best targeting practices in various 
contexts and would help the sharing experiences and avoiding repeating mistakes. 
 
Improving Targeting mechanisms 
x Community targeting can lead to leakage and abuse, so, where it is used, it should be 
combined with proxy means testing to verify community leader choices. Local 
participation should however be intrinsic in defining the eligibility criteria to minimise 
exclusion. This would also increase awareness of the actual, detailed criteria and how it 
applies. Household or individual targeting mechanisms are prone to cronyism but this 
could be avoided by informing people about their rights and the eligibility criteria. 
x Good planning and project documentation is essential to ensure that project workers 
apply eligibility criteria with fairness. 
x Establishing complaint and appeal systems to minimise fear of reprisal from making 
complaints, which prevents any improvements taking place in the selection system. 
 
Improving delivery efficiency and reducing leakage 
x Designing programmes to minimise opportunities for leakage/siphoning off funding or 
payments and establishing accountability check as routine practice.  
x Investments in infrastructure in rural areas to support delivery, for example schools or 
health posts. 
x Developing national population records and databases on household income etc to help 
target populations.  
x Monitoring and evaluation of programmes should focus more on poverty impacts and 
not just the technical side of programme outputs, such as the number of reached 
recipients or the effectiveness of the delivery process. 
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Chapter 4:  Countries in Middle Income Group 
 
Social Safety Nets in Middle Income Group 
Nearly all Middle Income countries are in High Human Development groups (with the 
exception are Iraq, Turkmenistan and the Maldives). The analysis below primarily draws on 
case studies of three Middle Income Countries – Iran, Turkey and Tunisia.  These countries 
tend to have a hybrid of universal and targeted social safety nets that use a variety of 
targeting methods: categorical targeting is being widely applied, as is geographical targeting. 
More recently, some countries have started to explore the use of proxy means testing 
(PMT). A number of countries have strengthened their social safety nets to manage the 
impacts of the global financial crisis and economic shocks, which has encouraged them to 
make social safety nets more inclusive. 
Table 10: Poverty Indicators for Middle Income Case Study Countries 
 
Source: UNDP 2013a 
 
Challenges in Targeting the Poor  
Poverty in middle income countries tend to be relatively stable in income per capita or in 
recent years have experienced economic growth. There remain however pockets of poverty 
and where this exists the intensity of deprivation can be relatively high. Only 7.3% of people 
in Turkey are vulnerable to poverty and 1.3% suffer from severe poverty, but the intensity of 
deprivation is 42% (UNDP 2013a). Middle income countries can have some of the following 
characteristics:  
x Weak institutions and administrative capacity that can inhibit successful 
implementation and monitoring. 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX
Intensity of 
deprivation
 Population 
vulnerable 
to poverty 
(%)  
 Population 
in severe 
poverty (%)  PP $1.25 
National 
Poverty Line
COMCEC Rank on 
HDI
Country value  Year  value  (%)   (thousands)   (%)   (%)   (%)   Education   Health  Living 
standards  
 2002–2011   2002–2012
12 Iran 0.742
15 Turkey 0.722  2003 (D)   0.028   6.6   4,378   42.0   7.3   1.3   42.3   38.4   19.2   0.0   18.1  
17 Tunisia 0.712  2003 (W)   0.010 d   2.8 d   272 d   37.1 d   4.9 d   0.2 d   25.0   47.3   27.6   1.4   3.8  
Headcount
 Contribution of deprivation 
to overall poverty (%)  
 Multidimensional 
poverty Index 
 Population in 
multidimensional poverty 
 Population below income 
poverty line (%)  
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x Dispersed governance that can undermine programme development and 
implementation. 
x A high percentage of the population whose livelihoods are based on the informal 
sector and who are not registered with the state and not included social safety nets 
programmes. 
 
Case Study: Tunisia 
Tunisia is classified as being an upper-middle human developed country. For long it has 
been praised as a successful economic development story in Africa and the Middle East, as 
its education and health systems and living standards are well-developed. The country has 
relatively high poverty rate at 15%. Along with the large number of young unemployed 
especially among graduates, rising polarisation and increasing dominance of the informal 
sector in the economy. Poverty and social exclusion have been cited as a catalyst for the 
revolution in Tunisia in 2011 and the call for political transformation. Tunisia saw a sharp 
economic decline after the revolution which overthrew the former president, Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali, from power. A wave of Tunisians returned from Libya at the same time, 
contributing to record-high unemployment figures (World Bank, 2013k). Tourism dropped 
by 30% during the year, and security concerns and political unrest have continued to date. 
 
Tunisia has undertaken a series of household consumption, budget and living standards 
surveys to provide information on the wellbeing levels of households measured by total 
expenditure (11281 sample household). The "access to services" component offers a variety 
of additional information on the accessibility of households to various public services and 
social programmes for a total sample of 5690 households. The sample of these surveys is 
distributed across the various regions in Tunisia and covers various strata (INS-ADB-WB 
2012, Measuring Poverty, Inequalities and Polarization in Tunisia 2000-2010) (African 
Development Bank, 2013).  
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SSN Programmes in Tunisia 
x Typical SSN programmes in Tunisia: subsidies, cash transfers and targeted non-
contributory programmes. 
x Providers: Government social protection includes SSNs. Some international NGO and 
donor agencies. 
x Total SSN expenditure across all programmes is estimated 4% of GDP.. 
 
Against the backdrop of political volatility, the government has adopted major social safety 
nets programmes to address poverty - the National Assistance Programme for Needy 
Families (Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses), the Free Medical 
Assistance (PNAFN-AMG1) and the Programme on Access to Affordable Care (AMG2) that 
transfer unconditional cash directly to beneficiaries. The government also provides indirect 
transfers through subsidies on food and fuel.  
Direct Transfers: Unconditional Cash Transfers 
Tunisia’s direct SSNs transfer, excluding food and energy subsidies, account for about 0.5% 
of GDP (Silva, Levin and Morgandi, 2013, 16). The country spends 69% of its SSNs on 
unconditional cash transfers, 27.9% on free waivers, health and education, and 0.2% on 
training. Slightly over 4% of Tunisians are covered by some form of SSNs. The majority of 
this coverage, around 30%, takes the form of free waivers on health and education, while 
the remainder is through cash transfers. 
The most important programmes are the National Assistance Programme for Needy 
Families (Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses) and Free Medical 
Assistance (PNAFN-AMG1), and the Programme on Access to Affordable Care (AMG2). 
Households that have a “free healthcare card” are considered to be beneficiaries of the 
National Programme for Needy Families and others have a reduced-rate healthcare card 
(AMG2). The PNAFN covers about 7.5% of Tunisians, mainly poor widows, poor elderly, 
disabled people and the poor in Central-West and North-West areas of the country (Silva, 
Levin and Morgandi, 2013, 115-6). Under-coverage is rather large, as the PNAFN or AMG2 
together exclude 48.9% of poor families in Tunisia. 
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Diagram 2: Social Safety Nets in Tunisia 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Direct social transfers (assistance for needy families and access to health care) have helped 
reduce poverty in Tunisia. The African Development Bank estimates that without the 
programmes, the poverty rate would be 1% higher and the extreme poverty rate would be 
0.5% higher (table 11).  
 
Table 11: Impact of the Direct Transfers Programme on Poverty Incidence in Tunisia 
Poverty line With transfers Without transfers Difference 
Poverty incidence 15.7% 
(0.007) 
16.5% 
(0.008) 
0.8% 
(0.001) 
Extreme poverty incidence 4.6% 
(0.004) 
5.3% 
(0.004) 
0.7% 
(0.001) 
Source: African Development Bank 2013 
 
However, there are several clear signs of leakages in the SSN programmes. The poorest 
quintile has little knowledge of the SSN programmes run in the country. Middle-income and 
rich people know more about SSN Programmes and are twice as likely to personally know 
someone benefitting from the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families than a 
Social Safety Nets 
General 
Compensation 
Fund 
Programme for 
Needy Families 
(AMG1) 
Programme on 
Access to 
Affordable 
Care (AMG2) 
Indirect Transfers: 
Food and energy 
subsidies 
 
Direct Transfers: 
Unconditional 
Cash Transfers 
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poor person (Silva, Levin and Morgandi, 2013, 28). This suggests leakages to the upper 
income groups, and secondly, it suggests weak information flows to the poorest.  
 
The Free Medical Assistance for the Poor Programme (FMAP) is a good example of 
institutional shortcomings that cause significant leakages and under-coverage. The FMAP 
provides free healthcare to the poorest households and low user fees for vulnerable 
households. After the revolution in 2011, FMAP was extended to cover 26% of Tunisian 
households (Arfa and Elgazzar, 2013, 7). According to Arfa and Elgazzar (2013, 7), there is 
very little monitoring of FMAP and the accountability mechanism is not well documented. 
Similarly, the eligibility criteria are not clear. This makes the programme very prone to 
leakages and inefficiency. Furthermore, because selection is based on historic data, when 
people’s circumstances change such that they do no longer qualify, they do not have to 
notify the authorities (Ibid.). The system is not any better in terms of exclusion errors, as 
there is no official appeal system. 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs has an incentive to keep the number of enrolled people high, 
as the Ministry then receives a lump sum from the national budget (Arfa and Elgazzar, 2013, 
7). The usage of this funding is not routinely checked, which suggests that governance is not 
robust nor targeting effectiveness. There are also some signs that the FMAP might be used 
as a form of social pension when the National Social Security Fund/National Fund of 
Retirement and Social Security is insufficient in guaranteeing financial security for elderly 
people (Ibid.). 
 
PNAFN has a registry of its beneficiaries, but they are selected by local commissions that use 
categorical targeting without verifying actual household consumption, income or assets 
(Arfa and Elgazzar, 2013, 7). Instead, selection is based on self-declared income (below 
US$1.25 a day), household size, the number of family members with disabilities or chronic 
illnesses, and a household head who is not able to work because of mental or physical 
impairment. 
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Indirect Social Transfers: Food and Fuel subsidies 
The Tunisian government provides a range of subsidies on fuel and basic foods (Table 12). 
There is no doubt that the General Compensation Fund is becoming a growing burden on 
the State budget, but it has contributed to reducing poverty and inequality. Food subsidies 
stand at TND 1,150 million, representing over 6% of total public spending in 2011. With the 
rise in energy and foodstuff prices on the international market and the depreciation of the 
dinar against the major currencies, the budget allocated to the General Compensation Fund 
(CGC) rose to record levels in the 2011 fiscal year. In the context of a still high poverty rate 
coupled with the economic burden of the social system instituted), there is an absolute 
need to analyse the effectiveness of the food subsidy system in improving the living 
standards of the poor and vulnerable population. 
 
Table 12: Subsidies in the Prices of Various Subsidised Products in 2010 
Products Sales price Cost price Subsidy amount % of subsidy 
Large bread (400 gr)  230 430 200 46.5% 
Baguette (220 gr)  190 272 82 30.1% 
Semolina  450 1030 580 56.3% 
Flour 630 1190 560 47.1% 
Tomato paste 1600 1670 70 4.2% 
Half-skimmed milk 970 1020 50 4.9% 
Couscous  795 1415 620 43.8% 
Pasta   805 1425 620 43.5% 
Seed oil  900 1800 900 50.0% 
Sugar  970 1420 450 31.7% 
Source: African Development Bank, 2013 
The universal nature of food subsidies undermines their efficiency as a poverty control 
mechanism. Data from the 2011 National Budget and Consumption Survey shows that 
Tunisian households received TND888 million worth of food subsidies of which only TND107 
million went to poor households. Furthermore, this data reveals that only 9.2% of subsidies 
go to the poorest households, 60.5% go to middle class households, 7.5% go to rich 
households and 22.8% are diverted outside households (restaurants, cafés, tourists, illegal 
cross-border trade). In general, analysis of the distribution per capita of subsidies according 
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to income quintiles reveals a bias in favour of affluent households. In 2010, the subsidy per 
capita for households in the first quintile was estimated at TND68.2 compared to TND89.1 
for second quintile households. In fact, subsidies can be poorly targeted. The first factor of 
potential bias is consumption of a subsidized item by the non-poor. For instance, the richest 
households may consume certain subsidized items more than the poor and consequently 
benefit more from the subsidy system. Indeed, the amount of subsidy reaching each 
household depends on the volume of subsidized goods it consumes which, in turn, varies 
with its income level. The second factor of bias is the subsidization of products that are very 
rarely consumed by the poor. 
 
In response to rising international oil prices, Tunisia reduced subsidies on fuel and increased 
domestic oil prices in September 2012 and March 2013 (World Bank, 2013k). The long-term 
sustainability of all subsidies has been questioned by the government, as the now former 
Prime Minister Hamali Jebali has reportedly expressed a view that subsidies should not be 
provided to 'those who are not in need and do not really deserve to be supported financially 
by the state' (Masrour, 2012).  
 
Opposition to subsidy reform in Tunisia is around 40% of the population (Silva, Levin and 
Morgandi, 2013, 31, figure 0.30). When asked about the preferred subsidy removal, over 
40% favoured diesel subsidies, while the removal of cooking oil and sugar subsidies received 
around 30% support (31, figure 32). The majority supported directing savings from subsidy 
reductions to the poor (33, figure 0.32). 
 
 Targeting Mechanism of SSNs Programmes in Tunisia 
x The current method of targeting populations that receive direct transfers is means 
testing.  Despite the fact that the poverty rate is higher in rural areas and poor 
regions are identifiable, there is no geographical targeting, so programmes are not 
necessarily hitting the poorest. However this has been recognized and the Ministry 
of Family and Social Affairs is taking steps to through the Social Protection Reforms 
Support Project in April 2013, to strengthen the institutional capacity of the 
government of Tunisia to design social protection reforms and improve the targeting 
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of SSN programmes (Murray, 2013). The upshot is a move towards Proxy Means 
Testing for all social safety programmers.  The last National Household Consumption 
Survey was prepared in 2010 and National Institute of Statistics is conducting a 
population census, which will include some micro-data from households. The new 
data will be correlated with 24 other ministries’ databases to prepare a unified 
registration system for all applicants for social expenditure. 
x The current system of universal food subsidies is not targeted by definition yet many 
poor people depend on food subsidies (7.5% of the household consumption), 
compared to more affluent households (2.9%).  The Gini index reveals that food 
subsidies reduce inequalities - the index was 37.4% in 2011, but it would have been 
38.5% without subsidies (African Development Bank, 2013). Reform could take two 
formats – restricting subsidies to poor households or replacing subsidies with a more 
targeted safety net programme. The downside of the complete abolishment of food 
subsidies would be the short-term poverty rate which would increase by around 
3.6%, while extreme poverty could be expected to increase by 1.7% It has been 
estimated that a blanket cash transfer would offer a more equal share of benefits 
than the current food subsidy system. At the moment, the share that the poorest 
income quintile receives through food subsidies is actually lower, only 82 per cent, of 
what it would receive through a blanket and perfectly egalitarian direct transfer 
system (ibid).  
 
Case study: Iran  
The Islamic Republic of Iran is among the high human development countries that are highly 
dependent on oil export revenue.  In the last two decades investment in education and health has 
improved human development indicators. 60% of government revenue is from exports of oil and 
gas. In 2012 Iran exported 4 million barrels of oil per day making it the second largest economy in 
the Middle East and North Africa in terms of GDP US$484 in 2012. A sharp fall in oil exports since 
2012 as a result of sanctions has pushed the economy to counteract. Prices of imported goods have 
increased significantly and the exchange rate for the Rial has depreciated rapidly, losing nearly 80% 
in value against the US$ in only one year (June 2012-October 2013). These changes have had a huge 
impact on the poor pushing more people below the poverty line (19%, 2007) and resulting in 
reduced expenditure on social protection and social safety nets programmes.  
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x Typical SSN programmes in Iran: Untargeted subsidies, with recent moves towards 
targeting. 
x Providers: Government social protection. 
x Total SSN expenditure across all programmes is estimated to 2.7% of GDP. 
 
Since 1980 Iran has subsidized petroleum products, basic foodstuffs, medical goods and 
utilities, firstly to manage hardships during the eight-year war with Iraq, and then to prevent 
political and economic challenges after the war. Subsequent to the Iraq invasion of Iran in 
1980, the Iranian government introduced rationing and kept consumer prices for energy, 
basic foods, medicines and utilities (water, power and sewage) well below market prices.  
 
Whereas this support is partly effective, subsidies are not specifically targeting the poor, and 
it remains costly. Energy and food subsidies, and credit subsidies are excessively large, and 
their distribution is skewed toward the rich. These subsidies were estimated to absorb 25% 
of Iran's GDP of $335 billion (2009 price). Subsidies for energy products alone accounted for 
10% of Iran's GDP in 2010 (World Bank, 2011). According to Iran’s Ministry of Economics and 
Finance, 30% of people in middle and upper quintile income brackets were the beneficiaries 
of 70% of all subsidies. In 2010, Iran spent an estimated $100 billion on energy subsidies, 
about twice the size of its government budget and one fifth of its GDP. Other subsidies, such 
as bread and medicine, added another $5 billion (Esfehani, 2013).   
 
In 2010, the Government of Iran began to implement economic reforms that phased-out 
subsidies on energy products and replaced them with universal cash transfers as 
compensation for rising energy prices.  Under its Targeted Subsidies Reform, the price of 
energy was to be gradually increased over a five-year period and subsidies eliminated for 
sixteen items and services. The retail prices of petrol, diesel, fuel oil, and liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) were required to increase to no less than 90% of Persian Gulf free on 
board (FOB) prices. Table 13 and 14 set out the categories of petrol prices (subsidized, semi 
– subsidized and free market prices introduced by the government and the allowances 
according to the type of vehicle. 
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Table 13:  Petrol Subsidies in Iran 
Petrol Subsidized Semi- Subsidized Free Market 
      
Regular 
1000 rial                 
($0.08) 
4000 rial 
($0.32) 
7000 rial 
($0.57) 
 
Table 14: Petrol subsidies by type of vehicle 
 
   Type of vehicle 
Semi-subsidized  
        Litres 
    Free Market  
          Litres 
Personal car -  Less than 1800cc 60 300 
Personal car - More than 1800cc  - 300 
Hybrid taxis 300 300 
Gasoline Taxi  500 300 
Hybrid pickup 200 300 
Gasoline pickup 400 300 
 
As part of the 2010 reforms the prices for electricity and water were set to increase to cover 
the full cost price. The Targeted Subsidies Reform also set out the intention to eliminate 
subsidies for wheat, rice, cooking oil, milk and sugar (and subsequently also bread) over the 
same five year period. In lieu of subsidies, the government committed to distributing small 
sums of cash to individuals. 
The intention was that the programme would be implemented by 3 different organizations 
– the Department of Welfare, the Ministry of Industries and Mines and the Social Security 
Organization. However the government subsequently established a new government body, 
the Subsidy Reform Organisation, which plan and oversees the distribution of cash 
payments. The Iranian government is paying cash safety net amounts of $40 (2010 prices) 
per adult per month to all citizens, with no targeting mechanisms to make a distinction on 
the basis of income or deprivation.  According to an unofficial database, 90% of population 
are affected by the current subsidy reform programme and the cash transfers are not likely 
to be sufficient to compensate for the extra costs of living experienced by the poor as a 
consequence of subsidy elimination.  Moreover, following the imposition of economic 
sanctions the adult rate has declined in real terms.  
 
Rationing fuel subsidies has been a catalyst for a new black market for petrol. Considering 
the opportunity cost and depreciation expenses it is more economical and rational to sell 
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petroleum rations rather than use them.  This has been particularly common among pick up 
vans and taxi drivers who qualify for higher rations.  
 
A second phase of the programme was due to start from in June 2012 with the aim of 
increasing cash transfers to each family. However this plan has been suspended, due to 
sanctions and the recent change in government. A untargeted subsidy programme is 
expensive and is not specifically targeted to the poor. The level of leakage is significant. The 
new government is planning to introduce more targeted social safety nets based on cash 
transfers to reduce poverty. This has the potential to improve targeting towards the poor. 
To be effective a robust social protection policy should be based on a strong social justice 
framework to avoid misappropriation and abuse. Iran has some way to go to develop the 
governance and implementation structures that would make targeting effective.   
 
Case Study: Turkey 
Turkey has experienced rapid economic growth and development in the last decade or so 
and as a result has improved income levels. Turkey is considered to be one of the most 
successful examples of development in view of the fact that GDP has tripled from US$233 
billion in 2002 to US$785 billion in 2013, with the country rising to be the 18thlargest 
economy in the world (and establishing the country’s membership of G20). More 
importantly Turkey has risen from a country with a middle human development index 
(0.671) to a high human development index (0.722).  
 
Table 15: Turkey’s HDI trends*  
Year Life 
expectancy        
at birth 
Expected 
years of              
schooling 
Mean years of 
schooling 
GNI per 
capita (2005 
PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 56.5 7.4 2.9 5,872 0.474 
1985 60.1 8.3 4 6,583 0.530 
1990 63.1 8.8 4.5 7,960 0.569 
1995 66.1 9.5 4.8 8,539 0.598 
2000 69.5 10.6 5.5 9,675 0.645 
2005 72.1 11.7 6.1 11,320 0.684 
2010 73.7 12.9 6.5 12,440 0.715 
2011 74 12.9 6.5 13,344 0.720 
2012 74.2 12.9 6.5 13,710 0.722  
Sources: UNDP (2013a) The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World Explanatory note on 2013 
HDR composite indices. 
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*based on consistent time series data, new component indicators and new methodology 
 
Table 15 shows the level of improvement in key indicators (life expectancy at birth, mean 
years of schooling and GNI per capita) in the period from 1980 to 2012. Such economic 
success has gone hand-in-hand with investment in social safety netsi. However, economic 
crisis in Turkey in 2001 endangered the livelihoods of many families who lost assets and jobs 
overnight. Many poor people were eligible for social assistance under the prevailing 
systems. Conditional Cash Transfers as a sub-component of a Social Risk Mitigation Project 
were introduced during this period to assist many of the affected families. This initiated a 
shift towards a system of strong social safety nets with robust targeting mechanisms (see 
below). Social assistance as a percentage of GDP has increased from 0.50% in 2002 to 1.4% 
in 2012, with the total number of beneficiaries reaching 6,370, 000 people. While social 
assistance expenditure remains low however by EU and global standards, increasing 
expenditure on social safe nets and apt targeting mechanisms have had positive impacts on 
poverty rates3. The government has eliminated extreme poverty (as measured by income of 
$1.25). Relatively little progress has been made in reducing inequality (the Gini coefficient 
for Turkey only declined from 0.44 in 2002, to 0.41 in 2007). Moreover, Turkey’s HDI 
remains below the average of 0.758 ‘for countries in the high human development group 
and below the average of 0.771 for countries in Europe and Central Asia’ (UNDP, 2013a).   
 
Public social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP at 12.5% is above the average 
among COMCEC countries, but well below the OECD average of 23% (Graph 5, OECD, 2012). 
Considering that Turkey’s GDP is the 18th largest in the world the percentage of social 
protection expenditure is low and it has not changed since 2002.  
 
Social Safety Nets in Turkey 
 
x Typical SSN programmes in Turkey: subsidies, cash transfers and targeted non-
contributory programmes. 
x Providers: Government social protection includes SSNs. Some international NGO and 
donor agencies. 
x Total SSN expenditure across all programmes is estimated to 1.4% of GDP. 
                                                          
3 Poverty rate declined from 26.0% in 2002 to 18.1% in 2012. 
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Graph 4: Public and private social expenditure in percentage of GDP in 2009 
OECD (2013) Social Expenditure Database (http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/expenditure.htm) 
 
By and large social assistance is a component of social protection strategy in Turkey (the 
term social assistance tends to be used instead of social safety nets).  Turkey has changed 
how its social support is administered since 2011 to improve targeting. Prior to this time, 
social assistance expenditure in general and the social security system, in particular, were 
dispersed across diverse institutions. This fragmentation meant that the unemployed, 
disabled, orphans, women and more vulnerable groups often had to rely on other forms of 
social protection, including informal ones. Critiques argued that the government’s 
organisation of social protection, including SSNs, was at risk of not creating a fair system 
because it did not target and deliver benefits to the right poor. Instead it operated on the  
basis of fragmentation and clientilism, with support provided to those who had accrued 
privileges through various relationships with political and influential organisations and ad 
hoc charity and reliance on kinship support for those who had not (Bugra and Candas, 
2011). Fragmentation in social assistance and service provision, and the multiplication of the 
number of agents and agencies involved, increased the number of decision-making settings 
at the micro level and generated problems of coordination, regulation and scrutiny. 
To address these problems and to improve targeting mechanisms and reduce leakage in 
2011, the government: 
 
x Strengthened the institutional framework and created a more comprehensive safety 
net system by incorporating a number of agencies into one government department. 
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Responsibility for all central government social assistance in this form came together 
under the umbrella of the new Ministry of Family and Social Policy in June 2011.  
x Improved targeting mechanisms and information systems for operational delivery 
and impact monitoring. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies has implemented a 
more robust methodology to reduce leakage and incorporate regional differences 
and inequality in the social support models. The new Integrated Social Assistance 
Information System (BSYHBS) uses a single proxy means test to target benefits more 
efficiently and effectively. All beneficiaries of social assistance working in formal 
public and private sectors are also now required to register with the Public 
Employment Agency (ISKUR). 
 
Social assistance and social protection institutions are set out in Diagram 3. The Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security is responsible for labour policy, employment environments, 
pensions and social security. The Ministry of Development delivers social support projects 
that are mostly ‘giving in kind’ schemes targeted at the poorest regions of Turkey. 
Municipalities provide in kind social assistance to the poor.  
 
Diagram 3: Social Safety Nets in Turkey 
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The Ministry of Family and Social Policy is the main department providing social safety nets 
for the elderly and disabled and children and provides conditional cash transfers to poor 
families based on school attendance and vaccination records.  Table 16 shows the main 
social assistance programmes indicating the types of assistance, objective and target 
populations.   
 
Table 16: Social Assistance delivered by Ministry of Family and Social Policies 
Programmes Types of assistance 
Target population 
and targeting 
mechanism 
Objectives No. of Beneficiaries 
Conditional cash 
transfer: 
Education assistance 
Primary school boy 30TL 
Girls 35TL – High school boy 45TL 
girls 55TL per month 
Families without social 
security. Methods Proxy 
means testing 
Access to education For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
887.008 Primary 
school boys and 
857.530 Primary 
school girls, 
152.566 High school 
boys and 138.324 High 
school girls 
Conditional cash 
transfer : 
Health Assistance 
Primary health care: pregnant 
period  30TL  and for  a baby 30TL   
Delivery in hospital only 70TL 
Pregnant women 
0-5 age group babies 
Methods Proxy means 
Testing 
Access to health services For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
889.871    0-5 age 
group children, 
 
Component of 
pregnancy assistance 
within CCT Health 
Assistance : 
25.699  Women 
Food Assistance  
(Family Assistance) 
 
 
 
Food assistance before religious 
festivals and when families need 
food. 
Families with income 
per capita below  234TL 
or lower than 1/3 of the 
net Minimum wages  
Verified means tests 
ID cards; Self targeting 
Cultural and religious 
To meet the basic needs 
of the beneficiaries 
For the year 2012 
 
552.969 families 
 
Sheltering (family 
Assistance) 
 
In Kind and cash assistance for 
the maintenance and the repair 
of houses of the poor and 
vulnerable people: Up to 
25000TL 
Families with income 
per capita below  234TL 
or lower than 1/3 of the 
net Minimum wages  
Verified means tests 
ID cards 
Social integration For the year 2012 
 
15.856 families 
Social Housing 
(Family assistance) 
Social Housing for the poorest 
and vulnerable people :  
Conditional: repayment 100TL 
1bed and 130TL for 2. Bed per 
months over 270 months 
Families with income 
per capita below  234TL 
or lower than 1/3 of the 
net Minimum wages  
Verified means tests 
ID cards 
Social Integration For the year 2012 
 
14.952 families 
Fuel  
(Family Assistance) 
Fuel (coal) free of charge for 
heating  in the winter for the 
poor. Once a year before the 
winter. Minimum 500kg coal are 
provided 
Families with low 
income per capita below  
234TL or lower than 1/3 
of the net Minimum 
wages  
Verified means tests 
ID cards 
Reduce energy bill for 
the poor and vulnerable 
people 
For the year 2012 
 
1.116.614 families 
Widow Women 
(Family assistance) Cash assistance to widow women 
with civil marriage  without social 
security: 250TL per month 
Widow women 
Verified means tested ID 
card 
Social integration 
 
 
For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
268.723 women 
Army personnel Cash assistance to the families of Army Personnel families Social integration For the end of the 
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Programmes Types of assistance 
Target population 
and targeting 
mechanism 
Objectives No. of Beneficiaries 
Family Assistance Soldiers During their military 
service: 25TP per month 
who do not have social 
security and are poor  
Categorical targeting 
October 2013: 
 
50.000 families 
Education Assistance Educational Material Assist and 
basic educational needs: Twice a 
year at start of semester 
Poor families and needy 
students; Verified means 
tested ID card 
Access to education For the year 2012 
 
370.708 students 
Education Assistance Lunch for school children who 
have to travel to school by bus – 
lunch provided every day in both 
semester 
Poor children  Access to education For the year 2012 
 
623.480 students 
Education assistance  Free School books Universal to all children Access to education For the year 2012 
 
15.668.179 
students 
 
Education assistance  Cash for Transportation, Shelter 
and food assistance for school 
children attending  primary and 
high school 
Poor and vulnerable 
families  
Geographical targeting 
Access to Eduction For the year 2012 
 
13.796  
students 
 
Eduction Assistance 
 
 
Cash to buss disabled to School: 
Annual Payment 
Disabled  person;  
ID card; Verifies means 
testing 
Access to education for 
vulnerable groups 
For the year 2012 
 
40.915 
students 
 
Building dormitories 100 to 300 person capacity 
dormitories are build for high 
education 
Needy  students at 
higher education 
 
Access to higher 
education 
Between 2009- 
October 2013 
 
147 dormitories 
Health Assistance Vehicle  for  disabled person Disabled person 
ID cards; Medical 
Report, verified means 
testing 
Social integration For the year 2012 
 
10 disabled persons 
Health Assistance Test – tube baby project 
Age 23 – 39 
Low income groups lower less 
then 1/3 of the minimum wage 
Test tube treatments for 2500 
families  
Health insurance premium  
For low income group ranging G0 
(0-340, 50TL) to G1, G2, G3 (2. 
043, 00). 
Government pays health 
insurance premium 
Women and families 
with financial difficulties 
ID cards  
Medical report 
 
 
Poor citizen without 
social security 
ID Card 
Verified means testing 
 
Access to health 9.5 million people  
Assistance for the 
special Purposes 
Public Soup Kitchen 
Provide hot meal  for the whole 
family daily 
Vulnerable people: Elder 
people, disabled 
unemployed  
Categorical 
To alleviate rising food 
prices. 
For the year 2012 
 
619 people 
Assistance in crisis 
and emergency 
situation 
Disaster Relief 
Cash and in Kind support  
People who are affected 
by disaster such as 
earthquake, flooding, 
fire etc ; ID Card 
Disaster and crisis relief  For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
559.065 people 
Assistances 
Implemented 
according to the Law 
no. 2022 
Allowances for elder person over 
65 years old who are weak, and 
abandoned; 130, 62TL per month 
Old people over 65 years 
old 
ID Card 
Verified means testing 
 
Social integration For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
505.207 people 
 
 
 
Implemented 
according to the Law 
no.2022 
Allowances for disabled with 
income less than 243, 43 TL per 
capita in a family - 40% - 69% 
disability receive 
261, 24TL and 70% and over 391, 
Disabled  people 
ID Card  
Verified means testing 
Social integration For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
66.652 people 
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Programmes Types of assistance 
Target population 
and targeting 
mechanism 
Objectives No. of Beneficiaries 
86 TL per month 
Implemented 
according to the Law 
no.2022 
Allowances for disabled people’s 
relatives whose income is less 
than 243, 43TL per month:  They 
receive 261, 24TL per month 
disabled person’s 
relatives 
verified means testing 
Social Integration For the end of the 
September 2013: 
 
192 people 
Implemented 
according to the Law 
no.2022 
Payments to Silicosis Patients  
 
Silicosis Patients; ID Card  
Medical report 
Verified means testing 
Access to health For the year 2012 
 
398.335 people 
Home care Allowance 
 
 
Allowance for severely disabled 
person with income below 486, 
86TL per capita; Monthly 
payment 730TL 
The care of person in 
need and sever disabled 
person; ID Card 
Medical report 
Access to health Between 2003- June 
2013 
 
89.116 families  
Project Support Income generating actives 
Up to  15, 000TL for individual 
project; Maximum 50, 000 for 
sheep raising projects and 150, 
000 for cattle breeding for group 
based projects 
Social enterprise for 
poor families to 
establish business and 
sustain their business to 
survive 
ID Card 
Social enterprise 
 
 
 
 
 Between 2003- June 
2013 
 
10.673 families 
 
Project Support Employability Training Projects; 
Consumable material and pocket 
money paid to attend the course 
Poor women, 
unemployed and young 
people; ID Card 
Categorical  
Education training Between 2003- June 
2013 
 
1.699 families 
Project Support Social Service Project 
To decrease risk of social 
exclusion for disadvantage group 
Provide low cost social services  
 Women, the old and 
disabled children 
Categorical 
Inclusion and social 
integration 
Between 2003- June 
2013 
 
1.699 family 
 
 
     
Compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs, 2013. US$1 = 190 TL (2012).     
 
Targeting mechanism 
The above Table sets out social safety nets programmes in Turkey, their coverage and 
targeting mechanisms. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies provides assistance to five 
main areas:  
 
x family and children’s benefits, 
x old age and disability benefits,  
x non-contributory health insurance  
x in kind transfers to families.  
x Disaster relief and Public Soup – Kitchen or Assistance for specific Purpose 
 
Various targeting methods are used including geographical targeting (Ministry of 
Development), mean testing and self-targeting (Municipalities), proxy means testing (CCT), 
verified means testing and categorical targeting  (Ministry of Family and Social Policies).   
Targeted social assistance programmes provide support to the poorest six percent of the 
population in Turkey. The two targeted CCT programmes for education and health provide 
support for families who cannot afford to send their children to school and to assist families 
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in attending regular health visits for their children and pregnant women.  The CCT 
programme for education and health started in 2003, targeting 1.1 million beneficiaries 
through proxy means testing based on data from the Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey.  It has continued to expand since then.  As of 2013, 887,008 primary school boys, 
857,530 primary school girls, 152,566 high school boys and 138,324 high school girls have 
been supported to participate in education. In 2013,  889,871 children under the age of 5 (0-
5) and 25,699 pregnant women benefited from supported access to health services.  
 
In 2011, the approach to targeting the poor was revised to reflect changing poverty levels 
and context. A new Centralised national system has been developed by the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policies, aimed at identifying the poor with more precision. This involves 
use of a sophisticated computer database (BSYHBS).  The system is used to target and 
identify beneficiaries for the various SSN programmes identified in the Table 16. It links the 
databases of 14 ministries to bring together various information on the status of applicants 
and checks institutional records to create beneficiary portfolio that can be used for any of 
the programmes in Table 20. For example employment status and income are derived from 
the Social Security Department, land ownership/tenure from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
so forth. A condition to receiving benefits is that recipients who are able to work are 
involuntarily registered with the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR).  
 
For example targeted groups for health assistance include women, families with financial 
difficulties, and poor people without social security. This is the largest programme and it has 
very high coverage. The government pays health insurance premiums for 9.5m people from 
low income groups (as set out in the table below).  Eligibility is described on the basis of 
family income. A family member is regarded as poor if the family’s income is less than one-
third the minimum wage (<267 TL, 2013 price). If these criteria are met, the cost of the 
health needs of each member is covered by the government. 
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Table 17: Health insurance premium by income groups 
Income group Families eligible for insurance premium Contribution 
G0 Families with income  less than one third of the 
minimum wage (0 - 267TL) 
Do not pay Premiums – the 
government pays 
G1 Families with income between one third of the 
minimum wage and the minimum wage (267 TL to 
801 TL)  
Pay a premium of 33 TL (12% of 
the minimum wage) 
G2 Families with income falling between the 
minimum wage and twice the minimum wage (801 
TL to 1, 773 TL) 
Pay a premium of 102TL (12% of 
minimum wage) 
G3 Families with income more than twice the 
minimum wage (>1, 773TL) 
Pay a premium of 208TL (12% 
twice the minimum wage) 
 
 
The current system uses verified means testing to determine eligibility. This uses a hybrid 
mechanism that combines central criteria and data with local knowledge. Field visits provide 
further assessment and family visits are used to countercheck information provided in 
applications. This is carried out by personnel of the Social Assistance and Solidarity 
Foundations (Vakif) located in each of Turkey’s 26 provinces and 973 districts. Vakif serves 
as a bridge between the Ministry of Family and Social Policies and poor people. They assess 
applications for social assistance and provide cash and in kind assistance. 
 
Assistance for most programmes however only lasts for three months they then would be 
reassessed to be qualified for further assistance. For programmes such as widow’s support 
last for a year, but beneficiaries have to be recertified annually. Disabled and old people are 
not reassessed once classified as eligible. Those on health programmes, whose premiums 
are paid by the government are visited each year for reassessment. In some cases, where 
individuals’ income varies over a year, beneficiaries have to apply monthly so that their 
benefits can be adjusted according to circumstance. ‘If the system notes that the number of 
household members has changed due to births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and so forth, 
and is recorded in the public databases, the per-capita household income is revised 
automatically to reflect this, and appropriate premium levels are set’ (World Bank, 2013:9). 
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Application and Assessment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the new system has been fairly successful in identifying the poor with very low 
leakage (5% -10%), it is expensive in terms of administrative and infrastructural costs. For 
example the government has spent 10 billion TL on new software alone. Secondly the 
system also requires administrative sophistication and capacity, which has been problematic 
at the local level and many personnel do not have the necessary skills to run the centralised 
programme.  In addition, many families working in informal sectors are mostly excluded and 
Application form completed, accompanied by ID 
card/birth certificate 
Applicant gives Vakif permission to obtain info 
from Integrated Social Assistance Information 
System  
Personnel check whether or not the applicant has 
registered with any of the social security 
institutions (Bagkur, Emekli Sandigi, or SSK) and 
uses data from various databases to compile 
information on a family’s income.  
Further investigation undertaken by field officers 
who visit the family and neighbourhood.  
 
 Info from the field and database are entered into 
the computer and information passed to 
assessment committee.  
 
 Local assessment committee comprising province 
or district governor, Mayor, directors of education 
and health, director of agriculture, religious 
leaders, neighbourhood mukhtar (local leader) 
NGOs 
 
 Local assessment committee assess evidence and 
decide if the family is eligible for assistance.  
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do not have access to social safety nets. The World Bank survey (2010b) provides evidence 
that shows many people in informal sectors are not covered by the Green Card programme 
or any public programme of social assistance. They conclude that ‘bringing such workers and 
their families under the umbrella of social protection would complement policies to increase 
formal employment’. 
 
Recommendations for Middle Income Countries 
In middle income countries national strategies for social protection should include a framework for 
an overarching SSN system which would operationalize targeting mechanisms, state realistic goals 
for the programmes, define eligibility criteria, and build accountability mechanisms. More open 
public discussion on poverty issues and institutional shortcomings would help policy-making to be 
more inclusive. In the face of high youth unemployment, for example, unemployment benefit 
systems should be established. 
x Electronic databases should be used to share information about beneficiaries 
between different SSN programmes. 
x Making the packages of subsidised food items less appealing or slightly unpractical 
changes people's consumer behaviour so that more affluent people move to other 
products than subsidised food. 
x Information campaigns about available SSNs should be launched to address the 
problem of rich people being able to name more SSNs than the poor. 
x Many middle income countries do not use proxy means testing or follow them 
through appropriately.. 
 
Chapter 5: Countries in High Income Group 
High income COMCEC countries enjoy abundant natural resources. One consequence of oil 
wealth is generous support for public sector workers and it is typical in high income 
countries for the government to be the largest employer of nationals and for the public 
sector to be overstaffed (Al-Sheikh and Erbas, 2012).  Oil wealth also supports welfare 
systems that are an institutionalised feature of the social contract between the state and its 
citizens. These programmes tend to be funded by the state and to be universal for citizens. 
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Many are similar to welfare policies found in the EU and provide vulnerable populations, 
such as the elderly and disabled with considerable support. Healthcare is free to the general 
public and offers some of the most sophisticated and specialised care in the world. Free 
education is also provided to all citizens between the ages of 6 and 15, with considerable 
investment in educational reforms and infrastructure.  
According to the UNDP, the poverty rate is low in high income countries, ranging from 0.2 in 
Qatar to 0.6 percent of the UAE citizen (based on the multidimensional poverty index -the 
MPI ‘head count’). An additional 2-4% are considered to be vulnerable to multiple 
deprivation. The intensity of deprivation for those classified as experiencing 
multidimensional poverty is similar to countries of much lower income – in the United Arab 
Emirates it was 35.3%. (Note these statistics are based on the population that has full 
citizenship. If migrants and migrant-workers were included poverty rates would be much 
higher. )  
 
Qatar, UAE and Brunei-Darussalam are in very high human development categories. Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman are all rated as on the list of high human 
development index. However, this can mask inequalities on the basis of nationality and 
gender. Saudi Arabia has a very low rank on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) at 145 out of 
148 countries and below countries of lower income. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions – reproductive health, 
empowerment, and economic activity. Table 18 shows that in Saudi Arabia only 1% of 
parliamentary seats are held by women and female participation in the labour market is 
17.7% compared to 74.1 for men. The ‘performance of these countries relative to their level 
of development leaves scope for improvement’ (World Bank 2012). 
 
Table 18:   GII for 2012 relative to selected countries and groups 
GII Rank GII value 
GI per 
Capita 
PPP$ 
Maternal 
mortality 
ratio 
Adolescent 
fertility rate 
Female seats 
in parliament 
(%) 
Population with at 
least secondary 
education (%) 
Labour force 
participation rate 
(%) 
      Female Male Female Male 
United Arab Emirates     
(40) 0.241 42,716 12 23.4 17.5 73.1 61.3 43.5 92.3 
Bahrain      (45) 0.258 19, 154 20 14.8 18.8 74.4 80.4 39.4 87.3 
Qatar         (117) 0.546 87, 478 7 15.5 0.1 70.1 62.1 51.8 95.2 
Saudi Arabia (145)      0.682 22,616 24 22.1 0.1 50.3 57.9 17.7 74.1 
Source: UNDP, 2013a 
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In general data on social safety nets and poverty is very poor in high income countries and 
there is no official data on poverty rates. A World Bank survey of high income countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa draws attention to ‘inadequate targeting’ which has 
resulted ‘in signiﬁcant leakages of SSNs beneﬁts to the non-poor, siphoning off resources 
that could be used to decrease poverty and improve the distribution of welfare’ (2012:X). 
The main leakage is in relation to price subsidies on food and fuel, which sees the non-poor 
benefitting that do not need this support. The impact in revenue terms is high in these 
countries, where fuel and food subsidies account for 7-10% of GDP. Reforms are being 
considered that replace universal price subsidies with more targeted initiatives, using  
categorical targeting. In UAE categorical targeting has been introduced for the payment of 
social assistance to specific groups, including widows, the disabled, the elderly, orphans, the 
families of prisoners and abandoned women. 67,102 people benefitted from these targeted 
programmes across UAE in 2011 at a cost Dh 658 million. Given its total population 4.1 
million of which 80% are migrants and expatriates who do not qualify for social protection 
or SSNs support, the coverage through these safety nets is relatively high. However, the 
exclusion of migrants and foreign workers from access to most social protection and social 
safety nets in wealthy countries is a major and contentious policy issue and one that attracts 
a lot of attention (for example recent press coverage of migrant workers has drawn 
attention to the poor treatment of those injured on constructions sites for the football 
world cup in Qatar). 
 
Case Study: Saudi Arabia 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys abundant natural resources. Petroleum covers 80% of 
the country's budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings. The size of the 
population has soared from 6 million of the 1970s to the current 28 million. 47.8 % of the 
population is younger than 25 years of age. Encouraging growth of the private sector (in the 
telecommunications, natural gas exploration, power generation and petrochemical sectors) 
is intended to increase employment opportunities for young Saudis and diversification of 
the oil-dependent economy. The Saudi government has recently invested large sums in 
education and skills training to up-skill young Saudi people and reduce reliance on foreign 
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workers. Oil wealth has also allowed public sector workers to enjoy generous salaries and 
benefits, which skews preferences for government jobs as opposed to the private sector 
((Sullivan, 2013; Al-Sheikh and Erbas, 2012). An initiative under 2011 Royal Decrees to 
increase public sector employment and compensations may in fact further exacerbate 
unemployment in the long run. 
Unofficial estimates evaluate the number of Saudi citizens living below the poverty line of 
US$17 to be somewhere between two and four million people. A culture of silence in the 
country discourages open discussion about poverty. In 2011, for instance, three Saudi 
bloggers were jailed for making a film about poverty (Sullivan, 2013). The veil of silence was 
lifted for the first time in the state media in 2002 when the-then-crown-prince Abdullah 
visited a slum in Riyadh, exposing many Saudis to poverty in their own country for the first 
time. Poverty is a particular problem in the case of "stateless" people. The UN has estimated 
that there are about 70,000 people born in Saudi Arabia who, regardless of their place of 
birth, have not been granted Saudi citizenship and are therefore "stateless" (Sullivan, 2013). 
Many are members of nomadic tribes. This 'legal limbo' can mean that they are excluded 
from public benefits that only apply to citizens.  The government has committed to 
dramatically reducing poverty over the next 5 years through access to microfinance, job 
training and the creation of new jobs. 
 
Social Safety Nets and Targeting Approaches in Saudi Arabia 
x Typical SSN programmes in Saudi Arabia: universal subsidies for citizens. 
x Providers: government universal social protection.. 
x Total SSN expenditure (n.a.) 
 
For most of Saudi Arabia's 28 million citzens, universal subsidies for petrol, electricity and 
water are regarded as rights in a country with such abundant oil wealth. Saudi Arabia 
spends almost 10 % of its GDP on fuel subsidies and another US$13.3 billion on keeping 
down the price of electricity (Holmes et al. 2011). In addition, it has been estimated that 
Saudi Arabia spends about US$20.2 billion on water subsidies every year (ibid), which, 
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despite the high costs of producing drinkable water is available to all, including non-
nationals (Choudhury, 2004).  
The Ministry of labour and social affairs provides some social safety nets targeted at 
particular groups. For example it distributes social assistance to the unemployed, widows 
and widowers, females who have no living family members to support them, orphans, the 
disabled and families of those serving custodial sentences.  The state provides assistance on 
food and electricity bills for the poor, elderly, disabled and injured workers. These are non-
contributory safety nets and recipients are identified using categorical targeting. A social 
insurance system that covers a range of support including marriage and death grants and 
disability pensions is subsidised, although some groups do not qualify (eg agricultural 
workers, fishermen or foreign workers). Saudi Arabia also has an aid programme for 
paralysed children living with their families, which provides a maximum annual allowance of 
SR 10,000 for each paralysed child. There is also an aid programme for persons with 
disabilities who are cared for by their own families, with a maximum of SR 10,000 per 
annum for severe cases and SR 6,000 for those who do not benefit from vocational 
rehabilitation programs (Silva, Levin and Morgandi, 2013, 23) . 
In the absence of any income taxation, the Islamic alms system of Zakat is administered by 
the state and contributes a great share to the social spending of the county. Regulations 
concerning Zakat are focused around savings, investment and property, as well as livestock, 
traded goods, silver/gold, buried treasure, minerals and crops (Althnian, 2012, 1). The range 
of levy varies - the current rates of Zakat applied to the value of traded goods is 2.5%, while 
crops from irrigated land incur a Zakat rate of 5%, a 10% levy is applied non-irrigated land 
crops and 20% to found treasures (Althnian, 2012, 4). Althnian (2012) argues that there is 
scope to use Zakat to extend social protection by, for example, including undeveloped land 
in the Zakat system which could potentially lower land prices, help housing problems or, if 
the land owners decide to keep their land, increase inflow to the Zakat system (14). Many 
people in the member countries of the Islamic Development Bank prefer to pay and give 
Zakat by themselves directly to recipients or in-kind and not through governments. In 
addition, traditional family institutions and solidarity systems are used as far-spreading 
safety nets to protect relatives in case of financial hardship, illness or disability.  
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Limited official data about the poorest in Saudi Arabia impedes true evaluation of the 
targeting mechanism of the country’s SSNs policies and target the country's policies. 
Generally speaking, universal energy subsidies are costly and divert funding away from pro-
poor expenditure (IMF, 2013, Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012). Even though universal subsidies 
have been argued to be inefficient and pro-rich, people in lower income quintiles will 
depend on them Categorical targeting will tend to treat different groups needs as 
homogenous and will not reflect that the need of some is greater than others and therefore 
address relative poverty.  
 
Case Study: Brunei-Darussalam 
Social protection has high coverage rates in Brunei. A large share of the labour force work in 
the military, civil service and police and benefit from mandatory schemes. Economic 
concentration in a few core sectors and industries also enables pension schemes to secure 
high levels of contribution compliance. 
x Typical SSN programmes in Brunei-Darussalam: universal subsidies for citizens. 
x Providers: Government  universal social protection. 
x Total expenditure (n.a.) 
 
Untargeted subsidies on fuel have wide coverage across different income groups. The 
sustainability of universal subsides, however, is questionable given the fiscal deficit of 
Brunei (Sainah, 2010, 152). There is serious leakage to non-residents, most notably through 
Malaysians entering the country to access cheap petrol. There have also been cases of 
smuggling fuel over the border to re-sell it at higher prices, with customs officers facing 
misappropriation charges for accepting bribes to turn a blind eye to these illegal activities.  
Universal social protection schemes do not differentiate on the basis of people’s needs. In 
Brunei, despite free education and health care, the lack of targeted SSNs means that the 
unemployed, single parents, orphans, widows/widowers, elderly persons without families, 
divorced, the abused or the disabled receive very little support in terms of food, shelter or 
other government support (Sainah, 2010, 149). In this sense, universal approaches result in 
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under-coverage as they do not respond to the specific needs of certain groups. Recently 
new plans have emerged to reach out to families, women and children through the 
application of targeted cash transfers (Jumat et al., 2010). Families with less than BND150 
per month and per household member would be entitled to apply for: (1) monthly 
Subsistence Allowance of BND65/month per child; (2) monthly Financial Assistance 
Allowance of BND200 for the head of the household; (3) additional educational allowance of 
BND60 for each child in school. A system for employment opportunities for disabled people 
is also under development (Jumat et al. 2010). Suharto (2009, 19) recommends that Brunei 
Darussalam enhance access to subsidised housing to lower income groups. Though the 
government is dedicated to the wellbeing of its citizens, the management of social 
protection is fragmented between various ministries (Sainah, 2010, 152). 
 
Case Study: Oman 
Like other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) Oman relies heavily on oil and gas export 
income.  Oil was first discovered in the 1960s, since when income per capita has increased 
significantly reaching to US$24, 65 per annum. Following accession to the WTO in 2000 and 
a GCC customer union agreement in 2003, a liberalisation programme has accelerated and 
foreign trade and investment has increased significantly. To ensure there is a labour force 
for the expanding economy, the government introduced a specific programme in the 1990s 
aimed at increasing the proportion of Omanis employed in the private sector. By prioritising 
nationals over foreigners, the ‘Omanisation process’ is aimed at reducing labour force 
dependency on expatriates. The total population of Oman is 3, 295 million, of which 1, 282 
million are expats and 2, 013 million people are Omanis (statistical Year Book, 2012). 75% of 
the population live in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. 
 Unlike other GCCs, Oman’s oil resources are finite and it is possible that it could be 
exhausted within 25 years. Consequently since 2010 the government has taken a number of 
measures to reduce dependence on oil income: 
a) Diversification: encouragement of investment in the non-oil sector such as 
tourism and agriculture 
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b) Privatisation: promoting and supporting the private sector as a key player in the 
country’s development. 
 
Both of these programmes are aimed at creating jobs for the young and growing population.  
Oman’s employment policy and steady economic growth, which has averaged 6% per 
annum between 2000 and 2012, has enabled the government to invest in social protection 
policies and to fund social safety net programmes for its citizen. The development strategy 
has made noteworthy progress in improving human development indices in income, 
education and life expectancy as shown in table19. However table 19 also shows a low 
proportion of women participated in the labour market despite a number of policies and 
projects aimed at empowering women.  
 
Table 19: Oman’s HDI trends  
 
Year 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Expected 
years of 
schooling 
Mean 
years of 
schooling 
Female 
Seats in 
Parliament 
% 
GNI per capita 
(2005 PPP$) 
HDI 
value 
Labour force 
Participation 
rate% 
1980 60.8 3.4   9,404  Female  Male 
1985 66 5.7   14,777    
1990 70.6 7.6   14,275    
1995 72.9 9.3   15,856    
2000 74 9.8   18,272    
2005 73.4 11.6   20,350    
2010 72.8 13.5 5.5  23,219 0.728   
2011 73 13.5 5.5  23,672 0.729   
2012 73.2 13.5 5.5 9.6 24,092 0.731 28.3 81.6 
UNDP, 2013a 
 
Social Protection in Oman 
SSNs and targeted programmes aimed at vulnerable families, known as Social Security 
Families, are key components of Oman’s social protection strategy, as set out in Diagram 4 
below.  The Ministry of Social Development is responsible for policy and delivery of SSNs, 
the Ministry of Housing provides social housing and facilitates loans and land distribution; 
the Ministry of Man Power delivers labour laws, minimum wages (at different rates for 
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Omanis (325 OMR) and foreign workers (90 OMR4) and unemployment benefits (the 
unemployed receive 150 OMR per month). 
 
The Ministry of Awqaf (endowment) and Religious Affairs collects all Zakat money from 
individuals. Zakat is collected from those who give through the deposit of funds into special 
bank accounts (UNDP, 2013a). The department then distributes Zakat money to support 
families in need, mainly targeting those families receiving social security as shown in table 
20. 
  
The social insurance system in Oman is similar to that of European countries. Omani citizens 
have access to medical care and modern hospitals, maternity benefits and child care and 
free primary and secondary education. There are a number of pension schemes for retired 
government employees including the Civil Service Employees Pension Fund; Ministry of 
Defence Pension Fund; Royal Oman Pension Fund: Diwan of Royal Court; Pension Fund; 
Royal Guard Pension Fund: Homeland Security Pension Fund; Royal Office Pension fund and 
the Sultan’s Special Force Pension Fund. Since 2004 pension insurance protection has been 
extended to Omanis working for governments in the other countries of GCC.  Omanis do not 
pay tax, but they do pay a 7% contribution of their salary to their pension fund with 14% 
paid by the government. Pensions and social insurance have been widened to include 
private sector employees. Additionally there are two large private pension funds for those 
working in the petroleum and petrochemical industries. 
Migrants and foreign workers do not qualify for social protection support and are excluded 
from SSN programmes. Even though foreign workers are guaranteed a minimum monthly 
wage, they are nevertheless paid less than Omanis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 US$1 = 2.59 in November 2013. 
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Diagram 4: Social Protection in Oman  
       
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Safety Nets in Oman 
Access to SSNs and social services is uneven in Oman. It is more likely that families in urban 
areas benefit more from services provided by the government than those living in rural 
areas.  Poverty is not extreme in Oman, in that no-one is classified as suffering from income 
poverty below the international poverty line of $1-2 a day. However, according to the UNDP 
Millennium Development Goals Report, 2.6% of Omanis suffer from multidimensional 
poverty and 6.4% are at risk of falling into it. Areas of concern are access to clean water for 
30% of Omanis, and the fact that 12.7% do not have necessary calorie consumption. 
Moreover 5.7% of Omanis live in households with at least one child not enrolled in primary 
education (Human Development Report: Oman, 2012:90).   
Table 20 shows types of SSNs and targeting mechanisms. The government’s social security 
programmes primarily target vulnerable families to reduce poverty. However the coverage 
of these programmes tends to be low. For example, the total number of social security 
beneficiaries was 50,751 in 2009 (Oman statistical year book, 2010).  Some projects have 
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been successful with families receiving targeted support, for example children of Social 
Security Families are given computers, with free internet access. Additionally 1500 children 
annually receive scholarships to attend university; they also receive Eid and Hajj grants, 
emergency assistance and are exempt from fees when using public services. To encourage 
skills training so that young people are employable in the private sector, 120 OMR per 
month is transferred to young people who complete secondary school.  This is conditional 
upon finding employment in the private sector, or they have to return the money.   
Table 20 shows that various targeting methods are used including mean testing, categorical 
targeting and self-targeting. For example social housing is allocated to those with incomes 
of less than 500 OMR per month, which they have the right to own after 10 years residency. 
Several programmes also use local community assessment5, with tribal Sheikhs asked to 
provide information about individuals’ eligibility and to endorse candidates’ legitimacy on 
the basis that as community leaders they have detailed knowledge of community/tribe 
members’ economic and social circumstances. Tribal Sheikhs are employed by the Ministry 
of Interior, and their function as community leaders is to Act as intermediaries between 
individuals in the community and public administrations. 
For the programmes that if applies to, a Sheikh’s recommendation determines whether a 
person qualifies for social assistance or not.  This degree of patronage can lead to leakage 
and under-coverage of SSNs. Following the Arab Spring several protests in Oman in early 
2011 drew attention to the misappropriation of national funding at high levels of 
government. The King ordered an increase in pensions and social security benefits to 
identified families by 100%, with no reductions when members found work.  In addition the 
King created 50,000 jobs in the public sector and increased the number of student 
scholarships, and supported marriage allowance for young couples.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The number of Omani families who benefited from the housing assistance stood at 4,812 in 2012. 
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Table 20: SSNs in Oman for Social Security Families (Social Protection Law 2004) 
Social Security 
Family 
Programmes 
Types of Assistance Target Objectives 
Widowed 
Women 
Cash assistance to widows.  80 OMR 
per month for each child up to the age 
of 18; social housing; children receive 
scholarships to study at university in 
Oman or abroad. 
Widowed Women 
Categorical targeting 
Anti Poverty 
Orphans Access to Child Care Centres that 
provide all living, health, education & 
leisure facilities  
Orphans 
Categorical Targeting 
Anti Poverty 
The Elderly Allowances for elderly - Those over 60 
receive 80 OMR per month.  
People over 60 years who did 
not formally work in public or 
private sector. Means tested; 
supporting letter from a Sheikh. 
Anti Poverty  
Disabled Various benefits Disabled  people – disability and 
means testing 
Social Integration 
Housing Social Housing for the poorest and 
vulnerable people with an income of  
less than 500OMR 
Families means tested on 
income per capita, supporting 
letter from a Sheikh 
Social Integration 
Allowance for 
Marriage  
6000 OMR allowance for marriage to 
young men with incomes less than 500 
OMR.  
Young people with low 
incomes. Means tested and 
supporting letter from  a Sheikh 
Social integration 
Project support 
and  
conditional cash 
transfers 
Employability Training Projects for 
those who have completed secondary 
school; consumable materials and 120 
OMR pocket money to attend courses. 
Employment for Young people 
in private sector. 
Self targeting/self-nominating 
Access to 
education 
Sanal Fund 
Programme to 
support Small 
business 
Training young women and men to 
manage small projects; assisting young 
people financially and technically to 
set up their own business through soft 
loans (10, 000 – 15,000 OMR). 
Young people 
Self targeting/self-nominating 
A supporting letter from a 
Sheikh 
Entrepreneurship 
culture 
Sanad Textile 
Training 
Programmes 
Training/support for women in textile 
industry (women’s clothes); soft loans 
of maximum 5, 000 OMR per project 
and up to 15, 000  OMR is paid to a 
woman setting up a business 
Women  
Self targeting/self-nominating 
A supporting letter from a 
Sheikh 
Entrepreneurship 
culture 
Sandal Fund for 
financing 
Livelihoods 
Support job seekers; provide loans up 
to 3000 OMR per person and 5000 
OMR for a group of individuals – loans 
are interest free and repayable within 
7 years; social security benefit paid for 
up to three years.  
Social security families 
Self targeting 
Livelihoods  
 
 
There are some gaps in access to social protection in Oman, most notably in respect of 
women.  There should be specific policies or programmes that focus on girls education and 
tackling low levels of literacy among women. In addition, over half of Oman’s workforce are 
migrant workers (with very high levels in the construction industry and domestic work), but 
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there is basically no social protection or SSNs that apply to foreign workers in times of 
vulnerability or hardship.  Overall the legal provisions for the rights of migrant workers are 
inadequate - for example foreign workers can be deported when contracts end even if they 
have worked in the country for two years. If they resign from their jobs, but are not 
provided with documentation releasing them from their employment, they can also be 
deported. This puts them at risk of exploitation by employers.  
 
Recommendations for High Income Countries 
Research on poverty incidence should be undertaken so that poverty issues can be addressed by 
appropriate policy design. Otherwise attempts to alleviate poverty will remain ad hoc and 
unfocused.  In high income group the problem of Tackling Eligibility need to be addressed. The 
position of "paperless" people who were born in a country should be resolved and migrant workers’ 
rights to social protection must be addressed, otherwise their poverty remains as an endless cycle. 
x Viability of universal subsidies: Universal subsidies cover poorer people as well as the 
rich. However, as a poverty reduction strategy they suffer from leakage and high costs 
and are not likely to be financially sustainable in the long run.  
x Monitoring and Evaluation: There is generally very little information about the 
effectiveness of SSNs in many high income countries. Abundant oil reserves have 
allowed them to continue accustomed practices without much scrutiny of whether they 
are optimal. Hence, more information should be gathered about outcomes and the 
effectiveness of targeting of SSNs in these countries. Even major global institutions like 
UNDP and the World Bank cannot access good data from these countries. 
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Chapter 6: The Way Forward: Recommendations 
This report demonstrates that a ’one size fits all’ approach is not relevant to the design and 
implementation of social safety nets, but there are some generic recommendations that 
would improve how they function.   
The COMCEC member countries adopt a range of social safety net programmes and 
targeting measures. One of the main inadequacies of social safety nets in all country income 
groups, but in particularly those of lower income, is fragmentation, lack of coordination and 
diffusion of responsibilities to different government ministries. The involvement of a multiplicity of 
agents in social safety nets risks duplication and low coverage. 
The choice of targeting mechanism is often restricted by available data. In the most fragile countries, 
where poverty is pervasive, differentiation is complex, while in high income countries data on 
poverty can be sparse. Other countries, such as Turkey, have recently re-evaluated their data 
sources and established a unified registration system to improve targeting. Several countries, such 
as Senegal, are in the process of identifying the best targeting mechanisms for different programmes 
and target groups and what this means in terms of data sources. 
 
Targeting the poorest of the poor (bottom 10% to 20%) has proved problematic in Africa, where ‘all 
are poor’. There is a risk that targeting using specific criteria can result in a random selection of 
individuals that can depend where they sit in the life cycle. Categorical targeting in this situation can 
be more successful.  Using community leaders and local elites in selecting recipients for SSNs is 
common in low income countries, but this can be prone to cronyism and abuse. This risk increases 
where the participation of local people in programme scoping and the setting of eligibility criteria is 
scarce.  
 
Proxy means testing is practically non-existent in many countries. Instead, categorical targeting 
(using demographic profiles, such as "children", "women" or "elderly") has been the prevailing 
targeting method in the great majority of SSN programmes. In addition, the geographical allocation 
of SSNs benefits has been popular.  However a study by the World Bank (2013j) found that the worst 
leakages take place in programmes using only geographical targeting. Discussion around "patching" 
leakages mainly focuses on avoiding only one type of testing (usually geographical or categorical on 
their own). Use of proxy means testing would help to identify the most-needy recipients appropriate 
to each programme. The World Bank notes that housing characteristics are often an excellent way of 
defining the well-being level of households for proxy means testing, but this could require 
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development of data systems.  The current reality is that many poor countries do not have the 
capacity to apply this method and certainly not in a contexts dependent framework, which would 
make it most effective.   
 
Generally there is very limited data on the effectiveness of SSNs. Monitoring and evaluation 
assessments have so far focused mostly on outputs (the number of reached households or the 
effectiveness of the delivering system) instead of impacts. Evidence exists of programme successes, 
for example that cash transfers under the right conditions are more nimble, flexible and quicker to 
leverage those food distributions, but these are not well shared. 
 
Social safety nets, cash transfer improve the livelihoods of millions of people, but in so 
doing, they sometimes leave the root causes, such as structural inequality, unaddressed. 
The key challenge facing COMCEC countries is to ensure that tangible links exist between 
equity and the practical policy planning and implementation of social protection and social 
safety nets. As a framework this could establish long-term goals for both preventative and 
reactive SSNs.  
 
 
Recommendations: 
Previous chapters identify issues with targeting mechanisms deployed by SSN programmes 
in the COMCEC member countries and provide recommendations for each of the different 
country income groups. Key recommendations are reflected here. 
1. Building Institutional Capacity 
Building the capacity of state institutions and establishing an institutional framework that covers the 
design and implementation of social protection and SSNs effectively is essential. Consideration 
needs to be given to the establishment of one operational agency in charge of social protection 
programme delivery and monitoring to improve consistency in targeting methods and learn lessons 
as programmes develop. Capability assessments should be used to identify improvements in each 
country.  
2. Identifying the Poor: Data Sources and Targeting Mechanisms 
There is a need for population and socio-economic data sets to be developed that are appropriate 
for each country’s unique set of circumstances.  This is particularly important in low income 
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countries where registration systems are not well-developed. A database of household 
characteristics would assist the uptake of proxy means tests, which can help to target beneficiaries. 
A gap analysis and scoping exercise would help to identify what is needed.  
 
3. Identifying the Poor: Targeting Mechanisms: 
Development of data that supports targeting mechanisms that reflect the contextual needs 
of the country will ease choice of the most optimal combination. Clear scoping of the 
objectives and outcomes of each programme and the target beneficiaries is critical to 
selection of the right targeting mechanism. Use of proxy means testing alongside categorical 
or geographical targeting will help to target those most at need), although the risk of 
exclusion through PMT should be tested locally.  
 
4. Monitoring and Evaluation: Understand what works 
Consistent monitoring and evaluation processes should operate during programme delivery. This 
should include a risk management approach to targeting failure and lleakages. Networks should be 
established to enable sharing of good practice.  
 
5. Holding governments to account: 
Where possible local people should be involved in the development of eligibility criteria. Evidence 
from Bangladesh however shows that empowering local women to hold authorities accountable can 
help reduce leakage. Leakage and under-coverage can be reduced when people are informed about 
their rights and entitlements.  
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, a
nd
 
12
.1
%
 (2
00
3)
 
of
 p
oo
re
st
 
qu
in
til
e;
 
39
.3
%
 to
 
po
or
es
t 
qu
in
til
e 
(2
00
4)
 
 R
p 
10
,0
00
 a
 m
on
th
 fo
r s
tu
de
nt
s 
in
 p
rim
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
; R
p 
20
,0
00
 a
 
m
on
th
 fo
r j
un
io
r s
ec
on
da
ry
 
sc
ho
ol
; M
in
im
um
 R
p 
60
0,
00
0;
 
m
ax
im
um
 R
p 
2,
20
0,
00
0 
Di
re
ct
ly
 to
 m
ot
he
r 
(o
r w
om
an
 w
ho
 
ta
ke
s c
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
in
 th
e 
fa
m
ily
); 
th
ro
ug
h 
lo
ca
l p
os
t o
ffi
ce
s;
 
th
re
e 
tim
es
 a
 y
ea
r 
as
 lo
ng
 a
s e
lig
ib
le
. 
Bl
oc
k 
gr
an
ts
 to
 
sc
ho
ol
s 
Re
m
ai
n 
en
ro
lle
d 
in
 sc
ho
ol
 
n/
a 
10
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In
do
ne
sia
 
Ke
lu
ar
ga
Ha
ra
pa
n 
   Rp
 1
 tr
ill
io
n 
    
Po
or
es
t h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
Pr
ox
y 
m
ea
ns
 
te
st
in
g 
In
 2
00
7:
 
34
8 
su
bd
ist
ric
ts
 in
 4
9 
di
st
ric
ts
, 7
 
pr
ov
in
ce
s;
 
in
cl
ud
es
 
38
7,
92
8 
po
or
es
t 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 
(ta
rg
et
 in
 
20
07
 is
 
50
0,
00
0 
po
or
es
t 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
) 
M
em
be
rs
 a
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
 a
re
 
el
ig
ib
le
 fo
r b
ot
h 
As
ke
sK
in
(h
ea
lth
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
fo
r t
he
 p
oo
r)
 
an
d 
Ba
nt
ua
n 
O
pe
rs
io
na
lS
ek
ol
ah
 
(s
ch
oo
l f
ee
 w
ai
ve
r a
nd
 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
as
sis
ta
nc
e)
 
Ch
ild
re
n 
ag
ed
 0
–6
 
vi
sit
 h
ea
lth
 c
lin
ic
s 
to
 u
se
 h
ea
lth
 
se
rv
ic
es
 a
s 
ou
tli
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
De
pa
rt
m
en
t o
f 
He
al
th
 p
ro
to
co
ls.
 
Pr
eg
na
nt
 (a
nd
 la
ct
at
in
g)
 w
om
en
 
at
te
nd
 h
ea
lth
 c
lin
ic
s t
o 
re
ce
iv
e 
an
te
na
ta
l (
an
d 
po
st
na
ta
l) 
ex
am
in
at
io
ns
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
De
pa
rt
m
en
t o
f H
ea
lth
 p
ro
to
co
ls;
 
Ch
ild
re
n 
ag
ed
 7
–1
5 
en
ro
l a
nd
 
at
te
nd
 a
 m
in
im
um
 o
f 8
5%
 o
f 
sc
ho
ol
 d
ay
s;
 C
hi
ld
re
n 
ag
ed
 1
5–
18
 
ye
ar
s w
ho
 h
av
e 
no
t c
om
pl
et
ed
 9
 
ye
ar
s o
f b
as
ic
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
en
ro
l i
n 
an
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 to
 
co
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 9
 y
ea
rs
 
of
 b
as
ic
 e
du
ca
tio
n.
 
St
ill
 sp
or
ad
ic
; m
an
ag
em
en
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 is
 u
nd
er
 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
N
ig
er
ia
 
Ca
re
 o
f t
he
 P
O
O
R 
(C
O
PE
) –
 C
CT
 
Fe
m
al
e 
he
ad
ed
 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
, A
ge
d 
pa
re
nt
 h
ea
de
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
, 
Ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 
ch
al
le
ng
ed
 p
eo
pl
e 
he
ad
ed
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
(e
.g
. l
ep
ro
sy
 
pa
tie
nt
s)
, T
he
 
tr
an
sie
nt
-p
oo
r 
he
ad
ed
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s’
 
e.
g.
 se
as
on
al
 
fa
rm
er
s,
 V
VF
 
pa
tie
nt
s,
 H
IV
 
af
fe
ct
ed
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
w
ith
 
pr
ox
y 
m
ea
ns
 
te
st
in
g 
3,
00
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 
ea
ch
 in
 1
2 
pi
lo
t s
ta
te
s b
y 
en
d 
20
09
 
A 
ca
sh
 tr
an
sf
er
 (t
he
 B
as
ic
 
In
co
m
e 
Gu
ar
an
te
e 
or
 B
IG
) b
as
ed
 
on
 n
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
pe
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
d:
 1
 c
hi
ld
 N
1,
50
0;
 2
-3
 
ch
ild
re
n 
N
3,
00
0;
 4
 o
r m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
N
5,
00
0.
 A
 c
om
pu
lso
ry
 
sa
vi
ng
 (P
RA
I) 
of
 N
7,
00
0 
m
on
th
ly
 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 to
 
be
 d
isb
ur
se
d 
as
 a
 lu
m
p 
su
m
 
af
te
r a
 y
ea
r f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
f v
ia
bl
e 
m
ic
ro
en
te
rp
ris
es
 a
ft
er
 
un
de
rg
oi
ng
 tr
ai
ni
ng
. M
ot
he
rs
 &
 
de
sig
na
te
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
m
em
be
r: 
Pr
eg
na
nc
y 
gr
an
t: 
$1
3 
a 
m
on
th
 
du
rin
g 
pr
eg
na
nc
y 
an
d 
a 
2-
m
on
th
 
la
ct
at
in
g 
pe
rio
d;
 D
el
iv
er
y 
at
 a
 
he
al
th
 c
lin
ic
: o
ne
-t
im
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
of
 $
41
 
M
ot
he
rs
 a
nd
 
de
sig
na
te
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
m
em
be
rs
: 
Bi
m
on
th
ly
 
(e
du
ca
tio
n 
gr
an
t)
, 
m
on
th
ly
 
(p
re
gn
an
cy
 g
ra
nt
), 
an
d 
on
e 
tim
e 
(in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
de
liv
er
y 
gr
an
t)
 
Pr
eg
na
nt
 w
om
en
 w
ith
in
 
be
ne
fit
in
g 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 m
us
t 
at
te
nd
 a
nd
 sh
ow
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 
an
te
na
ta
l c
ar
e:
 B
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
en
ro
lm
en
t o
f s
ch
oo
l 
ag
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
in
 sc
ho
ol
 u
p 
to
 b
as
ic
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
le
ve
l (
i.e
. p
rim
ar
y 
to
 
ju
ni
or
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n)
. A
t 
le
as
t 8
0%
 m
on
th
ly
 sc
ho
ol
 
at
te
nd
an
ce
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 a
cc
es
s 
tr
an
sf
er
; T
ra
in
ab
le
 m
em
be
r o
f 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
in
g 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 m
us
t 
at
te
nd
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 in
 li
fe
 a
nd
 
vo
ca
tio
na
l s
ki
lls
, b
as
ic
 h
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
sa
ni
ta
tio
n 
as
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
 
Be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s r
ec
ei
ve
 fo
rm
s o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
ei
r c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
co
nd
iti
on
s i
s c
on
fir
m
ed
 b
y 
he
al
th
 a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
er
s;
 th
ey
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
es
e 
fo
rm
s t
o 
th
e 
lo
ca
l p
ro
gr
am
 
of
fic
e 
on
 a
 re
gu
la
r b
as
is 
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Tu
rk
ey
 
So
ci
al
 R
isk
 
M
iti
ga
tio
n 
Pr
oj
ec
t 
   Bu
dg
et
: $
36
0 
m
ill
io
n 
(0
.1
4%
 o
f 
GN
P;
 M
ay
 2
00
6)
 
Po
or
 fa
m
ili
es
 w
ith
 
ch
ild
re
n 
ag
ed
 0
–6
 o
r 
in
 p
rim
ar
y 
or
 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
, 
an
d 
pr
eg
na
nt
 
m
ot
he
rs
 (p
oo
re
st
 
6%
 o
f t
he
 
po
pu
la
tio
n)
 
Pr
ox
y 
m
ea
ns
 
te
st
in
g 
85
5,
90
6 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
; 
th
at
 is
, a
bo
ut
 
2.
5 
m
ill
io
n 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s 
or
 2
.8
%
 o
f 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
(e
nd
 2
00
6)
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
gr
an
t p
er
 m
on
th
: 
pr
im
ar
y-
-$
13
 p
er
 b
oy
, $
16
 p
er
 
gi
rl;
 se
co
nd
ar
y-
-$
23
 p
er
 b
oy
, $
30
 
pe
r g
irl
: H
ea
lth
 g
ra
nt
: $
13
 a
 
m
on
th
 p
er
 c
hi
ld
 a
ge
d 
0–
6,
 o
ve
r 
12
 m
on
th
s:
 G
irl
s i
n 
gr
ad
es
 7
 a
nd
 
9:
 $
40
 p
er
 y
ea
r; 
Gi
rls
 in
 g
ra
de
 8
: 
$4
0 
pe
r y
ea
r, 
pl
us
 a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t 
bo
nu
s o
f $
5 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 o
n 
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
w
el
l i
n 
an
 e
xt
er
na
l 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
gr
an
t, 
m
ot
he
rs
 
ar
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
/t
ra
in
ed
 a
bo
ut
 
ch
ild
 c
ar
e,
 n
ut
rit
io
n,
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 
re
le
va
nt
 m
ed
ic
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
at
 
th
e 
he
al
th
 c
lin
ic
s w
he
n 
th
ey
 
br
in
g 
th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
fo
r r
eg
ul
ar
 
m
ed
ic
al
 e
xa
m
in
at
io
n.
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
fo
r a
du
lts
: t
he
 lo
ca
l i
ni
tia
tiv
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 S
RM
P,
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r p
ro
je
ct
 su
pp
or
ts
 o
f t
he
 
Di
re
ct
or
at
e 
Ge
ne
ra
l, 
al
lo
w
 fo
r 
su
pp
or
t t
o 
ne
ed
y 
ci
tiz
en
s (
or
 
pa
re
nt
s o
f C
CT
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s)
 fo
r 
em
pl
oy
ab
ili
ty
 tr
ai
ni
ng
, 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
or
 
in
co
m
e-
ge
ne
ra
tin
g 
pr
oj
ec
ts
. 
M
ot
he
r o
r f
at
he
r 
(r
an
do
m
ly
 d
iv
id
ed
 
be
tw
ee
n 
be
ne
fic
ia
ry
 sc
ho
ol
 
ar
ea
s)
: C
as
h 
pr
ov
id
ed
 a
t s
ch
oo
l 
pa
re
nt
-t
ea
ch
er
 
m
ee
tin
gs
; l
oo
ki
ng
 
at
 m
ob
ile
 A
TM
 
ca
rd
s o
pt
io
n:
 3
 
tim
es
 a
 y
ea
r: 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
 y
ea
r a
nd
 
en
d 
of
 e
ac
h 
se
m
es
te
r a
s l
on
g 
as
 e
lig
ib
le
 
He
al
th
 g
ra
nt
 a
nd
 p
re
gn
an
cy
 
gr
an
t: 
vi
sit
 th
e 
cl
in
ic
 re
gu
la
rly
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
ta
bl
e 
gi
ve
n 
by
 
th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f H
ea
lth
; S
ch
oo
l 
at
te
nd
an
ce
 o
f a
t l
ea
st
 8
0%
 o
f t
he
 
to
ta
l e
du
ca
tio
n 
da
ys
 e
ac
h 
m
on
th
; 
N
ot
 to
 re
pe
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
gr
ad
e 
m
or
e 
th
an
 o
nc
e 
Lo
ca
l s
oc
ia
l a
ss
ist
an
ce
 o
ffi
ce
s 
se
nd
 fo
llo
w
-u
p 
fo
rm
s t
o 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s a
nd
 h
ea
lth
 c
lin
ic
s t
ha
t 
CC
T 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s a
tt
en
d;
 
of
fic
es
 re
ce
iv
e 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 
fo
rm
s i
n 
re
tu
rn
. L
oc
al
 o
ffi
ce
s 
en
te
r t
he
 d
at
a 
in
 w
eb
-b
as
ed
 
so
ftw
ar
e;
 p
ay
m
en
t a
m
ou
nt
s 
fo
r e
ac
h 
be
ne
fic
ia
ry
 a
re
 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 a
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
sis
 o
f t
ha
t d
at
a.
 
Ye
m
en
 
Ba
sic
 E
du
ca
tio
n 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
Pr
oj
ec
t 
  n
/a
 
Gi
rls
 in
 g
ra
de
s 4
–9
 
in
 a
ll 
ba
sic
 sc
ho
ol
s 
w
hi
ch
 sa
tis
fie
s 
sc
ho
ol
 se
le
ct
io
n 
cr
ite
ria
 in
 o
ne
 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e;
 G
irl
s i
n 
gr
ad
es
 4
–9
 in
 
ra
nd
om
ly
 se
le
ct
ed
 
ru
ra
l s
ch
oo
ls 
w
hi
ch
 
sa
tis
fie
s s
el
ec
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
 in
 se
co
nd
 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e 
(fo
r 
im
pa
ct
 e
va
lu
at
io
n)
 
Ge
og
ra
ph
ic
 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
21
5 
sc
ho
ol
 
ca
tc
hm
en
t 
ar
ea
s i
n 
on
e 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e 
an
d 
67
 a
re
as
 
in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 
go
ve
rn
or
at
e 
Gi
rls
 in
 g
ra
de
s 4
–5
: $
35
 p
er
 y
ea
r; 
Gi
rls
 in
 g
ra
de
 6
: $
35
 p
er
 y
ea
r, 
pl
us
 a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
t b
on
us
 o
f $
5;
 
Ad
di
tio
na
l p
ay
m
en
t u
po
n 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 c
om
pl
et
io
n 
of
 a
 g
ra
de
 
le
ve
l; 
pa
ss
in
g 
sc
or
e 
on
 
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t t
es
t 
n/
a 
Ch
ild
 a
tt
en
ds
 8
0%
 o
f a
ll 
cl
as
se
s i
n 
a 
2-
m
on
th
 p
er
io
d 
Th
ro
ug
h 
re
gu
la
r a
tt
en
da
nc
e 
re
co
rd
s c
ol
le
ct
ed
 fr
om
 sc
ho
ol
s 
by
 a
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
ne
l h
ire
d 
fo
r 
m
on
ito
rin
g;
 a
lso
 ra
nd
om
 sp
ot
-
ch
ec
ks
 in
 p
la
ce
 
 
